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A salesman is got to dream, boy. It comes with the territory.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Most employees who are "in sales," that is, who sell products and/or
services for a living, are compensated on an incentive basis2: income
fluctuates with performance, 3 usually in accordance with a periodic (more
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1. ARTHUR MILLER, DEATH OF A SALESMAN 138 (spec. illustrated ed. 1981).
2. See Sharon O'Malley, Considerable Options: There's No Single Sales
Compensation Plan that Fits All, and Progressive Dealers are Finding That Customization
is Key, PROSALES MAGAZINE, Dec. 2002, at 24 (quoting sales compensation expert John
Bremen for estimation that "85 percent of sales professionals rely upon commissions for at
least part of their salary"); DAVID W. BELCHER, COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 510
(1974) (noting that a 1970 study of 375 companies with sales organizations revealed that
80% of them used incentive plans for compensating sales employees); see also Bock v.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 257 F.3d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that "[t]he term
'wage-incentive systems' has been defined as 'a method of relating wages directly to
productivity"' and that "'commissions' are the paradigmatic form of incentive compensation
for salespersons").
3. The distinction between incentive and non-incentive compensation is not always
clear. It can be argued that in an absolute sense, most compensation plans are incentive
plans: people who perform well tend to receive better raises than people who do not. The
Conference Board, a business policy and research group, defines an incentive compensation
plan as setting "performance goals for specific jobs and reward[ing] the incumbents for
achieving the goals." THE CONFERENCE BOARD, REPORT No. 1127-95-RR, INDIVIDUAL
INCENTIVE PROGRAMS: A RESEARCH REPORT 7 (1995). Similarly, Connecticut Minimum
Wage Regulations define an "incentive plan" as
any method of compensation, including without limitation thereto,
commissions, piece rate, bonuses, etc., based upon the amount of results
produced, where the payment is in accordance with a fixed plan by which the
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frequently than annually) reconciliation schedule.4 There are numerous
types of sales incentive plans, some featuring large incentive components,
some not.5 The prototypical plan only compensates employees well6 when
they have selling success and bases the amount of compensation on a
formula tied to the revenues or profits of particular transactions. Such
plans are commonly described as "commission" plans.8
employee becomes entitled to the compensation upon fulfillment of the
conditions established as part of the working agreement.
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. §31-60-1 (1962). The idea seems to be that in incentive plans,
the relationship between performance and pay is more direct than in non-incentive
plans, whether or not the performance is measured objectively.
4. By "reconcile" it is meant that the incentive portion of compensation is calculated
and paid to the employee. Some states require periodic reconciliation, as for instance New
York:
A commission salesman shall be paid the wages, salary, drawing account,
commissions and other monies earned or payable in accordance with the agreed
terms of employment, but not less frequently than once in each month and not
later than the last day of the month following the month in which they are
earned....
N.Y. LAB. LAW § 191 (McKinney 2005).
5. For a thorough description of different types of incentive plans, see BELCHER, supra
note 2, at 311-35.
6. By "well," it is meant that the employee is well-compensated by comparison to
other sales employees and by comparison to other employees who perform work requiring
similar skill and effort. That, of course, is a generalization. However, it is fair to say that
the goal of most commission plans is to provide an upside potential that exceeds what the
employee could otherwise earn if paid on a time basis and to punish correspondingly non-
performers with an income that is lower than what a fixed compensation employee might
expect. See EUGENE M. JOHNSON, DAvID L. KURTZ & EBERHARD SCHEUING, SALES
MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS, PRACTICES, AND CASES 404 (1986).
Direct motivation is the key advantage of the commission method of
compensation. A strong incentive is provided to increase productivity. Sales
people are encouraged to think and conduct themselves as if they were in
business for themselves. Strong performers are attracted and encouraged,
whereas marginal performers are eliminated.
Id.
7. While commission formulas may be tied to either profit or revenue, the preference
appears to be to tie them to profit. See Danielle Kennedy, Rep Talk: Independent
Contractor or Employee? Commission or Draw: This Five-Step Plan Can Help You
Decide How to Pay Your Reps, ENTREPRENEUR MAGAZINE, Oct. 1998, at 99, 100 ("No
matter what industry the business owners or representatives I interviewed came from, they
all agreed that commissions must be based on gross profit."); O'Malley, supra note 2 ("[A]
large number of dealers pay commissions on margins-as opposed to commissions on gross
sales revenue-for two reasons: It helps curb the cost of compensation, and it propels sales
reps to sell at the highest possible price.")
8. The risk-reward/carrot and stick aspect of commissions earnings, discussed supra
note 6, is not typically described as a requirement of a commission plan. Most statutory and
case law descriptions simply focus on the requirement that commissions be a percentage of
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Commission plans are usually memorialized within documents called,
simply enough, commission agreements. Disputes over commission
agreements are common and tend to fall into two categories: disputes over
what unclear agreements mean9 and disputes over whether clear
agreements should be modified in the interest of fairness.' 0 Because
commission agreements tend to be one-sided affairs drafted by employers,"
profit or revenue associated with the thing sold. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §
600.2961(l)(a) (LexisNexis 2005) ("'Commission' means compensation accruing to a sales
representative for payment by a principal, the rate of which is expressed as a percentage of
the amount of orders or sales or as a percentage of the dollar amounts of profits." ); CAL.
LAB. CODE § 204.1 (Deering 2005) ("Commission wages are compensation paid to any
person for services rendered in the sale of such employer's property or services and based
proportionately upon the amount or value thereof."); Keys Motors, Inc. v. Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement, 242 Cal. Rptr. 873, 875-76 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that
two requirements of a commission plan are the selling of a product or service and
compensation as a percentage of sale price). However, it seems fair to include the carrot
and stick concept as part of the definition. To begin with, it is certainly an important
theoretical attribute of commission compensation. See JOHNSON, KURTz & SCHEUING, supra
note 6, at 404. Moreover, there is a point at which the absence of risk will negate a finding
that the plan at issue is a commission plan. Thus under regulations implementing the Fair
Labor Standards Act, for instance, a compensation plan without risk is not a commission
plan:
A commission rate is not bona fide if the formula for computing the
commissions is such that the employee, in fact, always or almost always earns
the same fixed amount of compensation for each workweek (as would be the
case where the computed commissions seldom or never equal or exceed the
amount of the draw or guarantee). Another example of a commission plan
which would not be considered as bona fide is one in which the employee
receives a regular payment constituting nearly his entire earnings which is
expressed in terms of a percentage of the sales which the establishment or
department can always be expected to make with only a slight addition to his
wages based upon a greatly reduced percentage applied to the sales above the
expected quota.
29 C.F.R. § 779.416(c) (2005).
9. See, e.g., Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1996)
(disputing meaning of unclear termination provision). The Gadsby opinion is discussed at
some length in this Article. See infra Part IV.
10. See, e.g., Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1988) (disputing
whether the covenant of good faith and fair dealing can modify clear terms of a commission
agreement in the interest of fairness); Cave Hill Corp. v. Hiers, 570 S.E.2d 790, 793-94 (Va.
2002) (holding that it was reversible error for trial court to allow jury to decide whether
commissions are due when commission agreement unambiguously provided that either party
could terminate agreement on thirty-days notice).
11. For a description of the more or less typical way in which commission agreements
are prepared, see Ellis v. McKinnon Broadcasting Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80, 84 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993).
The employment contract is a preprinted form agreement with blanks for the
employee's name, the date, and the amount of the draw. Indeed, [the employer]
does not dispute that it occupied a superior bargaining position. Instead, it
argues that certain aspects of the contract (i.e., starting date, commission rate,
2006]
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the plaintiff is invariably the employee, usually an ex-employee, 2 who
alleges that she has been deprived of an earned commission.13 Such
plaintiffs face significant impediments to success on their claims,
particularly as compared to other wage claimants.
Largely those impediments are created by uncertainties over the way
in which commissions accrue. Accrual, of course, is the method by which
wages are earned and become non-forfeitable. 4 When wages accrue over
time (hour, week, month, etc., far and away the most common accrual
method) it is possible to calculate the amount owed to the employee at any
moment and seldom any serious question that the condition precedent to
accrual-the presence of the employee at work at a given time and place-
amount of draw, etc.) were actually negotiated and that, in any event, [the
employee] never attempted to modify the objectionable forfeiture term.
Id.
12. There is no empirical support for this proposition. However, three observations
suggest that it is supported by more than supposition or anecdotal evidence. First,
employment often ends over a commission dispute, whether on a voluntary or involuntary
basis. See, e.g., Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996 (10th Cir. 1996) (litigating
situation where the employee resigned after commission dispute and brought sexual
harassment claims against company); Brown v. Am. Prop. Mgmt. Corp., 1 P.3d 1051 (Or.
Ct. App. 2000) (litigating situation where employer refused to allow employee to work
pending resolution of commission dispute). Second, it is reasonable to assume that
employees are less comfortable suing their current, as opposed to their former employers,
and may simply tolerate a greater degree of unfairness while still employed. See John J.
Donohue III & Peter Seligman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination
Litigation Over the Business Cycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 709, 722 n.19 (1993) ("There is
much evidence suggesting that only a small percentage of the instances of perceived
employment discrimination that occur on the job lead to lawsuits, in part because workers
generally do not want to sue their current employer."). And finally, many, perhaps most,
commission disputes are of the post-termination variety, namely, employer refusals to pay
commissions because the employee has been discharged or has resigned. See, e.g., Am.
Software, Inc. v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (litigating situation where
employer claimed commission agreement terminated right to commissions on termination of
employment). The post-termination commissions concept is discussed at some length in
this Article. See infra Part III.
13. The one large category of commission agreement claims featuring employer as
plaintiff is draw recoupment actions. It is common for employers to provide employees
with a drawing account, which is a periodically-paid advance on future commissions
designed to mitigate the liquidity problems that can arise for employees paid on a
commission basis. See Blenn v. En Pointe Technologies, Inc., No. H022598, 2003 WL
220603 at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2003) (describing a drawing account). When
employees fail to earn enough commissions to cover their draws, employers must often
initiate recoupment actions to force employees to repay them. See Michael J. Greene,
Annotation, Personal Liability of Servant or Agent for Advances or Withdrawals in Excess
of Commissions Earned, Bonus, or Share of Profits, 32 A.L.R.3d 802 (1970) (collecting
cases describing draw recoupment actions).
14. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 21 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "accrued compensation"
as "compensation earned but not yet paid").
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was or was not met. 5 Either she was there or she was not. Commissions,
by contrast, accrue episodically and upon the occurrence of conditions
precedent that are defined, often inarticulately, 16 by the parties' commission
agreement." A snapshot in time is not a very revealing picture for such
employees: at any given moment, a sales employee could be on the cusp of
closing many deals but be technically owed nothing. 8 Furthermore, unlike
claimants seeking wages that accrue over time, a plaintiff in a commission
case must prove to the satisfaction of the court or other tribunal that she
correctly interprets the terms and conditions of the accrual mechanism. 9
No rules have developed in the area of commissions claims, as they have in
other employment law contexts,2° to assist the plaintiff in meeting that
15. This, of course, is an intuitive explanation: When something accrues on a temporal
basis, the triggering event can be nothing other than the passage of time. However, there is
more to the story. Employers enjoy very few defenses to accrued wages. See infra Part
II.A. Thus, once time has passed, there is a sense of finality to wage obligations that does
not exist in most money-owed-for-services contexts.
16. See, e.g., Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324, 1328 (discussing an
agreement that was ambiguous on question of whether commissions continue to accrue after
termination).
17. See, e.g., Mytych v. May Dept. Stores Co., 793 A.2d 1068, 1075 (Conn. 2002).
("[I]n Connecticut, there is no . . . settled doctrine regarding the time at which an
employee's right to his wages vest, and, in fact, we have concluded herein that our wage
payment statutes expressly leave the timing of accrual to the determination of the wage
agreement between the employer and employee.").
18. For an extended discussion of the "snapshot in time" concept, see infra note 59 and
accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., Corcoran v. F. & W. Welding Serv., Inc., No. CV 91036083S, 1998 WL
13873 at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 1998) (awarding summary judgment to employer
when, inter alia, employee failed to meet his burden of proof to establish terms of
commission agreement); Benadum v. Cincinnati Floor Co., No. 85AP-176, 1986 WL 7489
(Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 1986) (sustaining jury verdict in commission claim on behalf of
employee; rejecting employer argument that employee failed to carry burden of proof on
commission accrual mechanism).
20. Claims for unpaid overtime compensation arising under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, for instance, are subject to the employee-friendly presumption when the employer has
not maintained adequate time records. See Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S.
680 (1946). In Mt. Clemens, the Supreme Court observed that:
where the employer's records are inaccurate or inadequate ... [t]he solution ...
is not to penalize the employee by denying him any recovery on the ground that
he is unable to prove the precise extent of the uncompensated work. Such a
result would place a premium on an employer's failure to keep proper records in
conformity with his statutory duty.
Id. at 687.
Instead,
[i]n such a situation ... an employee has carried out his burden if he proves that
he has in fact performed work for which he was improperly compensated and if
he produces sufficient evidence to show the amount and extent of that work as a
matter of just and reasonable inference. The burden then shifts to the employer
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burden.
Forty-two states and the District of Columbia have wage payment
statutes. 2  By and large, those statutes treat employers who fail to pay
wages harshly, 22 exposing them to a range of penalties and extra-
to come forward with evidence of the precise amount of work performed or
with evidence to negative the reasonableness of the inference to be drawn from
the employee's evidence. If the employer fails to produce such evidence, the
court may then award damages to the employee, even though the result be only
approximate.
1d. at 687-88. The accrual question in overtime claims turns on the number of hours
worked; the accrual question in commission claims turns on the employee's having met the
agreed-upon condition precedent to payment. Because employers typically draft
commission agreements, just as they keep time records, there could be a presumption in
commission cases that favors the employee's accrual evidence when there is doubt
concerning what the parties had agreed to. That, alas, is not the way that such problems are
typically handled. See, e.g., Corcoran, 1998 WL 13873, at * I ("Furthermore, as there was
no written employment agreement between Corcoran and F & W, the employer ... set the
rules as to whom and when commissions were due, Corcoran, unfortunately for him, was an
employee at will in the eyes of the court.").
21. Medex v. McCabe, 811 A.2d 297, 304 (Md. 2002). The states not having them are:
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Missouri, North Dakota and Tennessee.
22. There is, however, a great deal of variation to that harshness. Some statutes, such
as New Jersey's, only provide for modest fines and quasi-criminal sanctions, not extra-
contractual damages or attorneys fees. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:11-4.10 (West 2000).
Any employer who knowingly and willfully violates any provision of [the wage
payment law] shall be guilty of a disorderly persons offense and, upon
conviction for a violation, shall be punished by a fine of not less than $100 nor
more than $1,000.... As an alternative to or in addition to any other sanctions
provided by law for violations of [the wage payment law], . . . the
[Commissioner of Labor] is authorized to is authorized to assess and collect
administrative penalties, up to a maximum of $250 for a first violation and up to
a maximum of $500 for each subsequent violation....
Id. Other statutes, such as Connecticut's, are far more onerous. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-71g (West 2003). The statute explains that whether or not violation is willful,
violators "may" be:
(1) Fined "not less than two thousand nor more than five thousand dollars or
imprisoned not more than five years or both. . . if the total amount of all unpaid
wages. . . is more than two thousand dollars; (2) Fined not less than one
thousand nor more than two thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than one
year or both... if the total amount of all unpaid wages... is more than one
thousand dollars but not more than two thousand dollars; (3) Fined not less than
five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than
six months or both... if the total amount of all unpaid wages... is more than
five hundred but not more than one thousand dollars; or (4) Fined not less than
two hundred nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than
three months or both... if the total unpaid wages... is five hundred dollars or
less."
Id.; § 31-72 (explaining that a plaintiff may recover double damages); § 31-76 (explaining
that an employer "shall" be required to pay attorneys fees and taxable costs to prevailing
wage claimants).
SALES COMMISSION AGREEMENTS
contractual damages, 23 including fines, 24 liquidated damages, 25 personal
liability for shareholders 26 and even criminal sanctions.27 In most of those
statutes, commissions are included in the definition of wages.2' Thus, in
most states a failure to pay commissions is theoretically the same offense
as a failure to pay wages of any other type. However, the wage payment
laws only provide better remedies and harsher penalties when a plaintiff
proves that accrued wages have not been paid; such laws do not provide
guidance on how wage agreements are to be interpreted and thus provide
23. See, e.g., supra note 22.
24. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-72 (West 2003) (explaining that a plaintiff
may recover double damages).
25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1103 (1995) (demonstrating a liquidated
damages provision).
26. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-323 (2000) (stating that "either the corporation or
any officer thereof or any agent having the management of the corporation who knowingly
permits the corporation to engage in [a violation of wage payment laws] shall be deemed the
employer for purposes of this act").
27. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-71g (West 2003) (describing appropriate
prison sentences in lieu of or in addition to fines where employers violate wage payment
laws).
28. The following states have wage collection laws that do specifically define
commissions as wages: Alaska, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Oregon, South Dakota,
Virginia, and Wyoming. In five of them, Louisiana, Maine, South Dakota, Virginia, and
Wyoming, the statutes do not define the term "wages" at all. However, courts in at least two
of those states, Louisiana and Maine, have held that commissions are protected under the
wage payment laws. Pearce v. Austin, 465 So.2d 868, 873 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that
for purposes of wage collection actions, commissions are wages); Purdy v. Cmty.
Telecomm. Corp., 663 A.2d 25, 29 (Me. 1995) (holding that wage payment statute applies
to commissions). The Oregon statute defines wages in broad, generic terms. OR. REV.
STAT. § 652.210(3) (1987) ("'Wages' means all compensation for performance of service by
an employee for an employer whether paid by the employer or another person, including
cash value of all compensation paid in any medium other than cash."). Case law suggests
that it is to be interpreted very broadly. See State ex rel. Nilsen v. Oregon State Motor
Ass'n, 432 P.2d 512, 514 (1967) ("We construe 'wages' to mean all earned compensation
contracted to be paid by the employer for the employee's personal service regardless of the
nature of such compensation."). Only the Montana statute defines wages in a way that
leaves open the possibility that commissions were deliberately left out. MONT. CODE ANN. §
39-3-201 (2003) ("'Wages' includes any money due an employee from the employer or
employers, whether to be paid by the hour, day, week, semimonthly, monthly, or yearly,
and includes bonus, piecework, and all tips and gratuities .... ). The list does not purport to
be exclusive. However, by comparison to the typical wage payment law definition of
"wages," found in almost identical form in most of the laws, the absence of commissions
seems meaningful. See e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 200(a) (West 2003) ("'Wages' includes all
amounts for labor performed by employees of every description, whether the amount is
fixed or ascertained by the standard of time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method
of calculation."); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. § 260.2a (West 1992) ("[Wages] includes all earnings
of an employee, regardless of whether determined on time, task, piece, commission or other
method of calculation.") A Montana court does not appear to have addressed the question,
at least in a published opinion.
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no direction on how commissions accrue. 29  Because commission claims
usually turn on accrual questions, they benefit very little from the wage
payment laws and are typically litigated as nothing more than common law
contract claims.3°
But in contract they face impediments created by a competing policy
concern, namely, the employment at will doctrine and its analog,
management prerogative.31  It happens this way: A dispute arises that
29. See Shortt v. New Milford Police Dep't, 562 A.2d 7 ,14 (Conn. 1989) (noting that
wage payment law "does not embody substantive standards to determine the amount of
wages that are payable but provides penalties in order to deter employers from deferring
wage payments once they have accrued"); Harding v. Duquesne Light Co., 882 F.Supp. 422,
427-28 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that wage payment law "does not create a statutory right to
wages; rather, 'it provides a statutory remedy when the employer breaches a contractual
right to earned wages.' [citation omitted] It is the employment agreement between the
parties that controls in determining whether earned wages are due."). The wage payment
laws are not what has been termed "minimum terms" laws. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER &
MICHAEL C. HARPER, CASES & MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION &
EMPLOYMENT LAW 1, 936 (2000) (noting that the Fair Labor Standards Act overtime and
minimum wage provisions constitute "minimum terms laws" that establish "minimum
substantive standards that set a floor for private bargaining").
30. An astounding number of judicial decisions involving commission issues fail to
even mention the applicable wage payment law. They simply treat the commission question
as a matter of common law contract interpretation. See, e.g., Andree v. Siemens Energy and
Automation, Inc., 90 F.App'x 145 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying Wisconsin law); Brozo v.
Oracle Corp., 324 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2003) (applying Minnesota law); Abedi v. Kobo
Products, Inc., 44 F.App'x 96 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying California law); Mullowney v. Data
General Corp., 143 F.3d 1081 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying Illinois law); Gadsby v. Norwalk
Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying Ohio law); Pearce v. ELIC Corp.,
329 N.W.2d 74 (Neb. 1982) (noting that the parol evidence rule may be applied to disputes
in commission agreements); Benadum v. Cincinnati Floor Co., No. 85AP-176, 1986 WL
7489 at *14-15 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 1986) (noting that the procuring-clause theory
applies to commission contracts); Dooley v. Serv. Station and Related Indus., Inc., 32 Phila.
218 (Pa. C.P. 1995) (applying the plain meaning rule to interpret a commission agreement);
Polenz v. TCI Cablevision of Wis., Inc., 587 N.W.2d 457 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that
common law applies where there is no compensation agreement); Kreinz v. NDII Securities
Corp., 406 N.W.2d 164 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (applying the plain meaning rule to interpret a
commission agreement). The failure of a significant number of courts even to mention the
wage payment laws when resolving commission claims is quite significant and suggests
something about the standing of those laws in the collective consciousness of lawyers and
judges. It is difficult to imagine, for instance, a court resolving a discrimination or overtime
claim without at least a passing reference to the applicable statute. That it occurs frequently
in the commission context indicates a perception that commission claims are common law
contract actions, undoubtedly because such claims have received little notoriety as statutory
causes of action. It seems likely that that lack of notoriety is a function of the fact that little
has been achieved historically by pleading the wage payment laws.
31. "At will" means more than just freedom to hire and fire; it also implies the ability to
run one's business free of outside interference. See William R. Corbett, The "Fall" of
Summers, The Rise of "Pretext Plus, " and the Escalating Subordination of Federal
Employment Discrimination Law to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and
Hicks, 30 GA. L. REv. 305, 308 (1996) (noting that management prerogative is one of
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exposes a gap in a commission agreement or an unambiguous provision
that is patently unfair. Courts have frequently held, both explicitly and
implicitly, that the default for unclear agreements is to the employment at
will rule and the rule's corollary that rights not bestowed by the
commission agreement are retained by the employer.32 As such, when a
gap in a commission agreement causes uncertainty, it is only sensible to fill
the gap by assuming that the employer would have reserved its traditional
prerogatives.33 When a literal interpretation of an unambiguous provision
causes hardship, it is simply unfair in the way that at will determinations
are often unfair, regrettable but not actionable.34
It is the thesis of this paper that because of the way that
commissions accrue-episodically and on terms typically imposed by
employers-sales employees are particularly vulnerable to employer
opportunism.3 5 That opportunism is not restrained by the wage payment
laws, which take no sides in accrual disputes and is unreliably restrained by
the law of contracts, which is not a bountiful source of rights that restrain
opportunism under the best of circumstances3 6 and is a particularly poor
source of such rights for employees in disputes against their employers.37
employment at will's aliases)
32. See, e.g., Corcoran v. F. & W. Welding Serv., Inc., No. CV 91036083S, 1998 WL
13873 at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 13, 1998) (holding that because there was no written
employment agreement, employee was at will and employer set the rules for whether and
when commissions were paid).
33. See Gadsby, 71 F.3d at 1328 (noting that "absent express language to the contrary, a
[commission agreement] would not subject an employer to potential liability ad infinitum,"
for example, when the employer fails to incorporate an end-point to payment of post-
termination commissions, it is logical to assume that the employer would have done so).
34. See Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d 621, 627-28 (Wash. 1988)
(recognizing the harshness of the at-will rule but refusing to hold that an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing could contradict clear terms of a commission agreement).
35. By "opportunism," it is meant "self-interest seeking with guile," in Oliver
Williamson's phrase. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNoMIc INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM:
FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING, 47 (1985). See also D. Gordon Smith, The
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1424, 1433 (2002)
(describing the Williamson definition of opportunism as well as others).
36. Smith, supra note 35, at 1487 (noting that "judicial efforts to police opportunism in
contractual relationships tend to be limited to the contract doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing"); Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When
the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for
Resolving the Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 586 (1996) (noting that covenant of good
faith and fair dealing is a gap-filling device that only applies when contract is silent or
ambiguous on a particular question and is a doctrine shrouded in mystery, leading to
unpredictable and inconsistent results).
37. See Brozo v. Oracle Corp., 324 F.3d 661, 668 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting, in context of
dispute over meaning of commission contract, that Minnesota does not recognize covenant
of good faith and fair dealing); Willis, 748 P.2d at 627-28 (holding that covenant of good
faith and fair dealing could not restrain employer from relying on provision of contract that
allowed it to deny employee of post-termination commission for which employee was
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The solution advocated here requires that the job security question be
bifurcated analytically from the wage question. When the claim is that the
employee has been unlawfully deprived of job security (i.e., has been
unlawfully discharged), employment law and where appropriate, the at will
rule, controls.38 When the dispute turns on wages, that is, whether a
commission is due, a second question must be asked: Does the employee
allege facts that, if believed, would support the assertion that the employer
acted opportunistically? If the answer is no, the law of contracts governs
the liability question.39 If the answer is yes, fiduciary duty law governs the
liability question, with particular emphasis on fiduciary principles that have
developed under the law of general partnerships. The argument for
applying fiduciary law under those circumstances and in that way is
derived from two observations.
The first is that, as relates to the specific question of whether an
employee is entitled to be paid a commission, the relationship between
employers and sales commission employees fits the classic model of
relationships that are fiduciary. That conclusion is based on recent
scholarship on the question of when courts interpose fiduciary obligations,
in particular, Professor D. Gordon Smith's "Critical Resources Theory of
Fiduciary Duty."' 0  Professor Smith argues that fiduciary duty arises
whenever "one party ('the fiduciary') acts on behalf of another party ('the
beneficiary') while exercising discretion with regard to a critical resource
belonging to the beneficiary.""' Sales commission arrangements fit that
model because employers exercise discretion over the variables that
determine whether an employee will be paid a commission and then collect
the employee's "share" from third parties. 42
The second observation is that the entrepreneurial aspects of
procuring cause); Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (1983)
(holding that implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not apply to employment
contract terminable at will).
38. This Article takes no position on the continuing utility of the at-will rule in the job
security context. Rather, it argues that accepting for the moment that assumptions and
policy choices that underlie the rule are valid, such assumptions and choices do not support
protection for employer opportunism in a commission dispute.
39. Commission disputes that do not feature employer opportunism are more common
than one might think. For instance, employers often must resolve disputes between
employees competing for the same commission and frequently get sued by the disfavored
claimant. See, e.g., Petronella ex rel Richardson v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV
940544040S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2753 at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1997)
(involving facts where employee sues alleging that employer paid commission to another
employee rightfully belonging to her). Such claims would not ordinarily involve plausible
allegations of employer opportunism-the employer is not lining its own pocket and thus is
not acting self-interestedly-and thus would remain the province of contract law.
40. Smith, supra note 35.
41. Id. at 1402.
42. See infra Part IV.
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commission sales employment have much in common with the
entrepreneurial aspects of a general partnership. Commission sales
employment, like general partnership, is an investment scheme:
43
Remuneration is delayed; in order to realize gain, "investors" must consign
a great deal of discretion to their joint adventurers. 44  Fiduciary duty
principles have developed in the partnership context because discretion
provides entrusted partners with "the opportunity to expropriate value"
from those who have bestowed trust.45  The same opportunity to
expropriate value, stemming from similar operational imperatives, is
afforded to the employers of commission sales employees.46 Partnership
law is therefore a useful starting point for consideration of how and when
fiduciary duty can be used to limit employer opportunism under sales
commission agreements.
The second Part of this Article attempts to define commissions as a
compensation system and argues that the key differentiation between sales
commission plans and most compensation methods is risk. The third Part
describes the state wage collection regime, its weaknesses as a system of
rules for the collection of commissions earnings, and the problems inherent
in a contingent wage accrual mechanism that emanates chiefly from the
contract prepared by the employer. The fourth Part describes and analyzes
two published opinions that exemplify the problems described in the
second part, most particularly with regard to the at will rule and the
inadequacy of contract law as a source of protection for sales commission
earnings. The fifth Part makes the case for acknowledgement of fiduciary
duty as a restraint on employer opportunism under sales commission
43. The Uniform Partnership Act defines "partnership" as "an association of two or
more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit." Uniform Partnership Act §
101(6) (1997). "Investment" is defined as "the investing of money or capital in some
species of property for income or profit." 3 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 1306 (2d ed. 1954). Clearly a partnership is an investment,
with individuals investing their money or labor or both in the hopes of achieving a favorable
return. See Dreyfuss v. Dreyfuss, 701 So. 2d 437, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting
that a partnership is formed when, inter alia, "parties contribute to the capital or labor of the
business"). Commission sales employment is also an investment, not of capital but of labor,
where the employee invests the value of her time in the hopes of a favorable return.
44. By "delayed remuneration" it is meant investment risk. For a concise description of
why partners must repose discretion in one another, see Carol L. Kline, Protecting Minority
Shareholders in Close Corporations: Modeling Czech Investor Protections on German and
United States Law, 23 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 229, 247-48 (1999-2000) (noting that
partnerships are founded by a few people who contribute "not only capital, but also
experience and labor" and whose business relationships are "characterized by trust,
confidence and loyalty").
45. See Smith, supra note 35, at 1491.
46. Sales employees must rely upon their employers to run the business and then collect
revenues from third parties from which commissions will be derived. See infra text
accompanying note 165.
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agreements. The sixth Part makes the case for borrowing the scope of that
duty from partnership law whenever it is alleged that an employer has acted
opportunistically. The seventh and final Part makes the argument that
although it would be possible to accomplish the reforms advocated in this
Article through changes to the law of contracts, fiduciary duty is a better
choice because it is broader and not limited unduly by what is described or
implied within the four comers of the commission agreement.
II. RISK
The defining characteristic of a sales commission job is selling risk.
Those who work on a commission basis agree to place some percentage of
their anticipated annual compensation at risk of non-payment in the event
that sales goals are not met.47 Often, the quid pro quo for that gamble is the
opportunity to reap greater rewards than could otherwise be expected, but
not always. 48  The size of the gamble can vary from complete, e.g.,
compensation based entirely on commission, to very small, e.g.,
commission earnings constituting a couple of percentage points or less of
total annual compensation.
Risk distinguishes commissions from other compensation methods,
even those that feature contingencies. For instance, incentive bonuses are a
47. It is possible to quibble with the phraseology here based upon the type of
commission plan under consideration. When the plan at issue is a so-called "straight"
commission plan, indicating that employee receives no compensation unless she sells
something, it is hard to argue with the assertion that the plan's defining characteristic is risk.
When the plan involves a combination of salary and commission (called combination plans),
which is the more common of the two, it is possible to focus on reward and not risk. See,
e.g., JOE L. WELCH & CHARLES L. LAPP, SALES FORCE MANAGEMENT 314 (1983) (explaining
that it is possible to focus on reward and not risk, as in "[u]nder [a combination plan],
salespeople . . .are given an opportunity to earn additional income for accomplishments
which exceed the expected"). The distinction isnot significant. First, in most combination
plans, employees receive a lower base salary than they would if they were paid on a straight
salary basis. See BELCHER, supra note 2, at 511 (noting that "if sales jobs are paid on
straight salary, salaries are obviously higher than if sales jobs are paid on the basis of salary
plus incentive because in the second arrangement base salaries are adjusted downward to
account for expected incentive earnings"). Thus, in relative terms, some amount of what
such employees could expect to be paid in the absence of a commission arrangement is at
risk. More to the point, employees take commission jobs in order to accomplish what is
possible, not what is probable or merely average. By accepting a commission job of any
type, an employee runs the risk that she will not meet her goals and expectations.
48. It is possible to create a commission plan without "upside" potential, meaning that
the maximum that the employee could earn would be a sum approximating the market value
of the services were they performed on a fixed compensation basis. See WILLIAM J.
STANTON & RICHARD H. BUSKIRK, MANAGEMENT OF THE SALES FORCE, 301-02 (3d ed.
1969) (arguing that through a combination of commission caps and base salary design,
companies attempt to adjust the ratio between commission and salary to some optimum
level, such as eighty percent salary and twenty percent commissions).
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common feature of executive compensation arrangements. Bonuses are
contingent, in the sense that they are not guaranteed. However, they are
discretionary-meaning that they are subject to subjective and not
objective contingencies-and are paid or not paid at the whim of the
employer.49 Thus while employees who take jobs in which they are "bonus
eligible" may be described as taking a risk, it is a risk that the law views as
fully assumed by the employee and entitled to no special protection. On
occasion, bonuses will be subject to objective and not subjective
contingencies. Such bonuses are indistinguishable from commissions and
are entitled to the same legal treatment.5 °
There are also contingent wage methods that compensate individuals
for the quantity of production, often referred to as "piecework."51  Such
arrangements are nearly as risk free as those that feature fixed compen-
sation. Like wages that are fixed, piecework seldom gives rise to meaning-
ful disputes on the question of accrual: it is possible to calculate what an
employee is owed at any given moment simply by counting what she has
produced. It is not sufficient simply to be a warm body at work-which
renders piecework slightly more risky than jobs for which employees are
compensated on a time basis-but the risk of non-payment is very small, at
least relative to sales commission employment.
Risk is a difficult concept, and it is not the goal of this Article, beyond
the strictly obvious, to define the term or describe the myriad of ways in
which sales employees assume risk when they enter into sales commission
agreements. For purposes of this paper, it is argued that focusing on the
nature of compensation risk leads to three important insights into sales
employment as a distinct occupational category. First, the specific type of
risk assumed by sales employees causes commissions to accrue differently
than wages that accrue over time and, in turn, creates greater hardship for
sales employees under the at will rule. Second, risk is not merely assumed
by sales commission employees but is transferred by employers, who
assume correspondingly less risk when they hire employees on a
commission basis. And finally, by virtue of risk, sales commission
49. See Mathews v. Marietta Toyota, Inc., 606 S.E.2d 862, 863 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)
(explaining that discretionary bonuses are not enforceable as wage promises); Hudson v.
Village Inn Pancake House of Albuquerque, Inc., 35 P.3d 313, 318 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)
(same); Kaplan v. Capital Co. of Am., LLC, 747 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)
(same).
50. See Blanton v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., No. 2-490/01-1468, 2002 Iowa App. LEXIS
1148 (Iowa Ct. App. October 30, 2002) (holding that incentive compensation called bonus is
entitled to the same treatment as commissions); Medex v. McCabe, 811 A.2d 297, 302 (Md.
2002) (same).
51. See Bock v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 257 F.3d 700, 706-07 (7th Cir. 2001)
(noting that a piecework system is an incentive compensation method featuring a "fixed
payment for each unit produced").
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employees are entrepreneurial and occupy a somewhat muddled realm
between normally distinct relational categories. Together those insights
help to differentiate sales employment from fixed compensation
employment and to provide the context for evaluation of wage collection
principles as applied to commission disputes.
A. Wage Accrual
As noted, wage accrual is the rate at which wages are earned. Under
fixed compensation arrangements, wages accrue over time and thus it is
possible to calculate what wages are due to an employee at any moment.
Under commission sales agreements, by contrast, nothing accrues over time
and employees earn their "wages," if they earn them at all, when all
preconditions for a commission have been met. Typically there are three:
(1) a sale of a product or service for which (2) the employee was the
procuring cause and (3) payment of the bill by the customer.
52
Wage accrual as a substantive right must be evaluated in conjunction
with the so-called at will rule. The at-will principle holds, of course, that in
the absence of contractual provisions to the contrary, both employers and
employees are free to terminate the employment relationship for any
52. Because commission accrual is a creature of the contract between the parties, it can
be almost anything that the parties say it is, and thus, one can only generalize when
attempting to describe what is typical. The formulation here is derived from two
observations. The first is that when contracts are silent on the question of how commissions
are earned, courts often hold that they are earned when an employee can establish that she is
the procuring cause of the sale in question. See Comerford v. Sunshine Network, 710 So.2d
197, 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that if commission agreement is silent,
commission is earned when employee makes sale (citing 3 C.J.S. Agency § 187. p. 88
("Accordingly, an agent selling goods on commission is entitled to a commission on goods
sold by him during the continuance of the agency .. "))). The second observation is that
while employees who work on commissions are often given periodic advances on
commissions that they have yet to earn-so called drawing accounts-and are paid on deals
before customers have paid for the products or services in question, most commission
agreements provide that employees must repay the draws if they do not earn sufficient
commissions to cover them or in the event that the customer cancels the order. Courts
typically hold that such provisions are enforceable. See Meyer v. Mason Publishing Co.,
372 N.W.2d 403, 405 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that when agreement is that employee
will receive commissions on sales, the employee's commission was not due or earned until
amounts for returned merchandise were deducted); Russo v. New York Life Ins. Co., 668
N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that employer can recoup commission
paid to life insurance salesman when insured cancels policy and recoupment is permitted by
commission agreement); Centerbank Mortgage Co. v. Shapiro, 655 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597
(N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (noting that "it is well settled that an action to recover excess monies
paid to an employee from a drawing account 'is viable where an agreement exists by which
the employee agreed to repay the excess drawn out of the account above the commissions
earned" (citation omitted)). Hence the formula: commissions typically accrue when the
employee sells something and the customer pays the bill.
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reason, good or bad. Most employment, whether it is on a commission or
fixed basis, is governed by the at-will rule.53
Later in this paper it will be argued that the at-will rule, as the default
in employment law, often serves an interpretive function in resolving
controversies caused by incomplete or unclear commission agreements.54
For present purposes, the at-will rule's significance lies in its role as a
delimiting principle for wage claims. Because of the at-will rule,
employees have no interest in future wages. There is no right, in other
words, to be employed long enough to earn any sum in particular. Any
claim for wages is, by definition, a claim for services performed in the
past.55
The bright line rule with regard to the future is complemented and
counterbalanced by a line, nearly as bright, with regard to what has accrued
from past service. By and large, fixed compensation employees must be
paid for time that they have devoted to their employer's affairs without
regard to the quality of such services or the extent to which the services
have advanced the employer's business interests. So long as the employee
was at the appointed place, at the appointed time, and at least going through
the motions of performing the appointed responsibilities, wages will be
due.56
53. It seems self-evident that most employees are employed at will, and commentators
typically assume as much without attribution. See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, The World
Turned Upside Down?: Disparate Impact Claims by White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1505,
1512 (2004) (noting that "[de]spite limited inroads on the at-will rule over the last two
decades, most employment decisions are still not subject to legal constraints other than
'excluder' reasons"); James Robert Ward, III, The Endowment Effect and the Empirical
Case for Changing the Default Employment Contract from Termination "At-Will" to "For-
Cause" Discharge, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 205, 206 (2004) (observing that "it appears
most employment contracts are for at-will employment"). The same assumption regarding
sales commission employees is made here.
54. See infra Part III.
55. See Yearwood v. Southern Life Systems, Inc., 531 S.E.2d 741, 743 (Ga. Ct. App.
2000) (noting that an at-will employee cannot sue to enforce the right to earn wages in the
future but may sue to compel payment of wages earned in the past).
56. It has long been assumed by employment lawyers that dissatisfaction with an
employee's services is not a defense to a wage claim. The doctrinal underpinnings of that
assumption are seldom discussed in the case law or legal literature. It seems that there are at
least two reasons that quality is not a defense. First, forty-two states have wage payment
statutes. Medex v. McCabe, 811 A.2d 297, 304 (Md. 2002). Most of those laws have
provisions that prohibit deductions from wages that are not specifically enumerated-
general dissatisfaction not being among them. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 193 (Consol.
2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-319 (2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 652.610 (2003). In Miller v.
C.C. Meisel Co., 51 P.3d 650 (Or. Ct. App. 2002), an employee sued to recover unpaid
compensation. The employer asserted by way of counterclaim that the employee's failure to
adequately perform his responsibilities constituted a defense to the wage claim. Id. at 653.
Relying upon the Oregon Wage Collection Law, the court rejected the counterclaim and
cited another case for the proposition that "there might seldom be prompt payment of
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There is, then, a very sharp distinction between the past and the future.
The right to be paid for services that have not yet been performed is nearly
nonexistent; the right to be paid for past services is nearly unqualified. It is
hard to argue that the sum of that equation is neutrality: in almost every
way that matters, the at-will rule benefits employers and burdens
employees.57 However, it is of no small consequence that the price of a
free contract5 8 for the employer is that it must settle with its employees
before releasing them. Or, to phrase the thought differently, the at-will rule
would be more harsh to employees, and the at-will rule's free contract
rationale obviously less palatable, if employers could both terminate
employees without a moment's notice and then escape liability for their
wages.59
termination wages if an employer, on some basis besides time worked, was allowed to
decide that the wages were not earned." Id. at 658. Thus, the first reason that quality is not
a defense to a wage claim is that such a defense will more likely than not be proscribed by
the applicable wage payment law. The second reason that quality is not a defense is derived
from the general rule that employees are not liable for business losses caused by their
inability to meet performance standards. That rule was described by the court in Fried v.
Aftec, Inc., 587 A.2d 290 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991):
Absent a special agreement, an employee whose best efforts resulted in poor
performance, causing a loss of profits, does not become liable for such losses in
a breach of contract action. An employer cannot give an employee negative
fitness reports, retain the employee, and later sue him for failure to perform the
agreement or for overall negligence or carelessness, allegedly causing the
company financial losses .... The employer's remedy is to fire the employee for
ineptness or lack of diligence.
Id. at 297 (citation omitted). If an employer cannot sue an employee whose ineptness
causes business loss, it seems to follow that the employer cannot refuse to pay wages
because of dissatisfaction with the quality of the employee's services.
57. Some commentators might not agree. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of
the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947 (1984). Professor Epstein argues that the at-
will rule is both good and fair. He describes it as good for reasons that are of no concern
here. He describes it as fair because of the free contract rationale-it allows both parties to
come and go as they please. Putting to one side the metaphysical question of whether a rule
must affect all persons equally in order to be fair, there is simply no way to seriously argue
that the at will rule burdens employees and employers the same. The prospect of losing
one's livelihood upon a moment's notice is simply more daunting, on average, than the
prospect of losing a key employee with equal suddenness. For an extended critique of the
supposed neutrality of the at will rule, see Carl v. Children's Hosp., 702 A.2d 159, 173-78
(D.C. 1997).
58. The free contract rationale of at will employment was described succinctly in
Nguyen v. CNA Corp., 44 F.3d 234 (4th Cir. 1995): "An employee is ordinarily at liberty to
leave his employment for any reason or for no reason, upon giving of reasonable notice,
without incurring liability to his employer. Notions of fundamental fairness underlie the
concept of mutuality which extends a corresponding freedom to the employer." Id. at 237
59. No support has been found, scholarly, judicial or legislative, for the proposition that
the wage collection regime developed as a conscious attempt to counterbalance the at-will
rule, at least with regard to at will's core limitation on the right to job security. There is a
great deal of evidence, however, connecting those laws to concerns over other
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The symmetry described in the preceding paragraph does not apply to
those who work on a commission basis. That is because such employees
have no right to a commission until a sale is consummated. In other words,
nothing accrues from past service 60 and thus the right to be paid, moment
by moment, is largely inchoate and must focus on events that will or may
occur in the future. Because the at-will rule also applies to such
individuals, it is possible for them to find themselves caught in a
manifestations of the at-will principle, particularly management's unfettered right to set the
terms and conditions of employment. Wage payment laws began to appear in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, largely as a response to the tendency of employers to pay wages in
script or tokens that had to be redeemed in company stores. See Robertson v. Opequon
Motor, Inc., 519 S.E.2d 843, 850 (W. Va. 1999) (discussing history of wage payment laws).
The early cases interpreting those laws devoted a great deal of time to addressing the
employer's argument that the laws unconstitutionally infringed upon freedom of contract.
See, e.g., Hancock v. Yaden, 23 N.E. 253, 255 (Ind. 1890) (upholding 1889 law providing
that miners be paid every two weeks and in lawful money); Atkins v. Grey Eagle Coal Co.,
84 S.E. 906, 906 (W. Va. 1915) (upholding 1913 law requiring employers to redeem
corporate scrip for lawful money and collecting cases from around the country holding
similarly). The legislative history over succeeding decades tended to focus on other forms
of employer opportunism. In Mytych v. May Department Stores Co., No. 03CV98485223S,
2001 WL 290485 (Conn. Super. Ct. March 2, 2001), the court quoted one legislator,
speaking in 1978 about the Connecticut Wage Payment law, as follows:
The payment of earned wages is a gut-level right that should be assured by
clear, strong statutes... The weaknesses of these statutes came to my attention
through the experience of a constituent whose wage check bounced. . . . A
person must be able to count on his paycheck-that it will be forthcoming...
and that, if paid by check, that the check will not bounce....
Id. at *6. In Dangerfield v. Montgomery Ward Co., 694 P.2d 439 (Kan. 1985), the court,
discussing the legislative history surrounding the Kansas Wage Payment law, noted:
The primary purpose of the legislation was to protect employees from the
docking or shorting of pay to cover alleged shortages. There was a recognition
that the absence of statutory constraints served as an invitation to employers to
withhold from an employee wages earned, and benefits such as vacation pay,
contributions to pension and welfare funds, and to otherwise manipulate and
prey upon employees through misleading statements relative to the terms and
conditions of employment.
Id. at 444. The point is that if the wage payments laws cannot be connected to concerns
over the lack of job security implicit in the at will rule, they are easily connected to other
perceived shortcomings of other manifestations of the at-will rule, namely, management
prerogative and the freedom to set the terms and conditions of employment, however
onerous on employees.
60. This rule does not apply to the non-contingent portion of a sales employee's wages,
as, for example, when total compensation includes a salary and commissions. Throughout
this Article, sales commission employees are referred to generically. That is not meant to
imply that they all have the same compensation plan; quite to the contrary. There are
numerous different types of commission plans, even a partial description of which is beyond
the scope of this Article. See BELCHER, supra note 2, at 512 (noting that "there are literally
thousands of sales incentive plans geared to the organization's products, markets, and
marketing objectives").
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netherworld of unfulfillable expectations: no right to be paid for work
performed in the past and no right to be around long enough to be paid in
the future.
B. Risk Transference
Commission sales employees accept higher risk than employees who
are paid on a fixed basis. What is also true is that there is an important way
in which employers who pay on a commission basis-particularly those
who pay on a "straight" commission basis61-assume less risk than
employers who do not. When an employer pays employees on a fixed
compensation basis, the employer runs the risk that it is paying too much,
that is, that its labor costs are or will be too high relative to gross revenue.
When an employer pays its employees on a commission basis, on the other
hand, its labor costs, expressed as a percentage of revenue, remain constant,
and it is the employees who accept the risk that the actual "value" of their
labor may be insufficient to meet goals and expenses.62 It is for that reason
that commission sales arrangements are especially prevalent in higher risk
industries where the need to control labor costs is particularly acute.63
61. "Straight commissions," of course, means that all income is based upon meeting
objective goals and none of it is based upon time. The phenomenon of risk transference is
one of the few topics discussed in this Article where there does appear to be important
difference between straight commission employees and those who work under combination
plans. By risk transference it is meant that the employer assumes less risk when the
employee assumes more. It only works that way, however, if it can be said that when taking
the contingent portion of an employee's wages out of the mix, the employer would be
paying a lower than market rate for the employee's services, computed on a time-value
basis. That, of course, is the expectation. See BELCHER, supra note 2, at 511 (noting that
base salaries ordinarily adjusted downward to account for expected incentive earnings).
However, it cannot be said that the employer has "transferred" risk if it pays a market rate
salary without regard to commissions. Thus, the risk transfer concept is clearly at work
when the employee is paid on a straight commission basis and also at work when the
employer pays the employee a comparatively lower base salary in light of the employee's
ability to earn commissions. It does not apply at all when the commission percentage is so
low, or the employer so generous, that the base salary can fairly be described as the market
rate for comparable services, computed on a time-value basis.
62. See STANTON & BusKIRK, supra note 48. It is noted that:
Another big advantage to the company [that pays on a commission basis] is that
selling costs are controllable in relation to sales, gross profits, or some other
base. The violent fluctuations of selling expenses as a percentage of sales that
often occur under salary plans can be virtually nonexistent if men are paid by
commission. When a firm is in recession, the ability to forecast and control
sales costs is particularly important.
Id. at 368.
63. See id. ("In some cases, a new firm that is not strong financially must resort to a
commission [plan] because it cannot risk the lack of control over selling expenses, even
though otherwise it might be better to pay the men a salary."). To the same point is WELCH
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There are certainly other reasons that employers choose to pay on a
commission rather than fixed compensation basis, such as the belief that
risk motivates employees to higher achievement.64 However, the risk
transference benefit has particular relevance to any consideration of
employer opportunism. A transaction that transfers risk often creates a
duty, implied when not expressed, that the transferor do nothing to harm
the transferee's ability to reap the benefit of its bargain. 65  The classic
example of that principle is insurance.66 Insurance is meant to provide
coverage for fortuitous events, meaning events that had not occurred before
the insurance policy was issued nor by the design of the insured after the
policy's inception.67 If it can be proven that the loss was known by the
insured in advance of her purchase of the policy or intentionally caused by
her after the policy's issuance, the insurer will be relieved of liability.6t
This is because the insured's conduct deprived the insurer of the benefit of
its bargain, namely, the statistical probability that the event that triggered
& LAPP, supra note 47, at 312 ("Generally, a straight commission plan is used by firms that
are in a relatively weak financial position and cannot risk any arrangement other than one
where selling costs can be related directly to sales.").
64. Most of the sales literature describes the motivational benefits of commission plans.
See, e.g., STANTON & BUSKIRK, supra note 48, at 312 ("Probably the major advantage of the
straight commission method of sales compensation is the terrific incentive it gives the
men."); ALBERT H. DUNN, EUGENE M. JOHNSON & DAVID L. KURTZ, SALES MANAGEMENT
CONCEPTS, PRACTICES AND CASES 428 (1974) ("Direct motivation is the key advantage of
the commission method of compensation. A strong incentive is provided to increase
productivity."). But see Alfie Kohn, Why Incentive Plans Cannot Work, HARVARD Bus.
REV., Sept.-Oct.(1993) (arguing that incentives do not intrinsically motivate people and
cause disharmony and dissension).
65. See CBS Broad., Inc. v. The Carsey-Wemer Co., No. B151721, 2003 WL 139986
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2003). In CBS Broadcasting, the plaintiff lent money on a non-
recourse basis, meaning that the borrower was not required to pay it back unless the
business venture for which the money was lent proved successful. The borrower made no
effort to make the venture successful, the loan was not repaid and the lender sued. The
court held that despite the fact that the loan was on a non-recourse basis, the borrower was
under an obligation to use commercially reasonable efforts to make the venture successful.
It cited another California case for the proposition that
[i]n the case of a discretionary power, it has been suggested the covenant [of
good faith and fair dealing] requires the party holding such power to exercise it
'for any purpose within the reasonable contemplation of the parties at the time
of formation-to capture opportunities that were preserved upon entering the
contract, interpreted objectively.
Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
66. See David G. Newkirk, An Economic Analysis of the First Manifest Doctrine: Paul
Revere Life Insurance Co. v. Haas, 644 A.2d 1098 (N.J. 1994) 76 NEB. L. REV. 819, 820
(1997) (noting that "[iut is unchanging black letter law that a contract of insurance is a
transfer of risk").
67. See PSI Energy, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 801 N.E.2d 705, 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
(describing the fortuity requirement as a fundamental element in insurance law).
68. Id.
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coverage would not have occurred by chance.69
The same basic principle applies to any analysis of sales commissions
as a compensation method. It seems reasonable that if an employer
chooses a compensation method that has the effect of transferring financial
risks to employees, such employer must be willing to accept some
limitation on discretionary activities that determine whether and to what
extent its employees will be paid.
C. Entrepreneurial Attributes
Risk defines commission sales, but it also confuses the relationship
between commission-earning employees and their employers, and stretches
what it means to be an employee into other relational categories, most
particularly "partnership. 7 ° What all commission sales employees share,
regardless of income level or professional status, is a position between two
of capitalism's major classifications.71 Because they are in it for a piece of
the action, they are entrepreneurs.72 Because they are told what to do and
69. Id. See also Rohm and Haas Co. v. Cont'l Cas. Co. 781 A.2d 1172, 1184 (Pa.
2001) (Catille, J., dissenting) (describing the benefit of the carrier's bargain as "insuring
against the risk of an occurrence, not the certainty thereof'); Newkirk, supra note 66, at 828
(comparing bargain of insured to that of insurer vis-A-vis risk transfer).
70. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Clackamas Gastroenterology
Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 445-48 (2003), commentators have become
interested in whether, under certain circumstances, it is fair to conclude that partners are in
reality employees for purposes of coverage under discrimination laws. See e.g., Ann C.
McGinley, Functionality of Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as "Employees" Under
the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57 SMU L. REv. 3, 5-6 (2004). This Article, also advocating
an economic realities approach to an employment law problem, considers the obverse
proposition: whether it is not fair under certain circumstances to treat employees as partners
for compensation purposes.
71. In traditional neoclassical economics, the three key factors of production are land,
capital and labor. KEITH S. GLANCEY & RONALD W. MCQUAID, ENTREPRENEURIAL
ECONOMICS 3 (2000). Entrepreneurs are usually associated with capital and employees, of
course, with labor. Sales commission employees, it is argued, fall somewhere between the
two.
72. Entrepreneurs are often described as individuals who both invest in businesses and
run them. See 2 WEBSTER'S SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 855 (2d ed. 1956) (defining "entrepreneur" as "an employer in his character of
one who assumes the risk and management of business"). Of course, sales employees do
not manage the businesses for which they work. However, there are other descriptions of
the entrepreneur that focus not on management but on the taking of risks. Schumpeter, for
instance, did not think it essential that an entrepreneur own or manage something but rather
that he or she be "enterprising." JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 74-75 (1961). Other observers have also tended to minimize the degree to
which one must own something in order to be an entrepreneur. For instance, GLANCEY &
MCQUAID, supra note 71 at 6, have noted: "[E]ntrepreneurship may be viewed as requiring
the taking of calculated risks, and bearing the uncertainty in return for potential benefits,
such as large profits. So a key entrepreneurial skill is calculating, managing and minimising
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when to do it, they are employees.73 They occupy, in other words, some
middle realm, a hybrid of two dissimilar and in some ways contradictory
economic categories.
Indeed, it is difficult to consider the recognized forms that
partnerships take and not see kinship with commission sales. When parties
agree to operate a business together and do not incorporate, the business is
a general partnership.74 When they team up for business purposes that are
[sic] this risk .. " Commission sales employees are entrepreneurial in the sense that they
are enterprising risk takers.
73. See Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449, (noting that control is the "touchstone" for
determining whether individual is "employee"). Note, however, that a recurring theme
throughout commission cases, particularly those involving individuals paid on a straight
commission basis, is the question of whether such individuals are independent contractors or
employees. Largely, courts treat the distinction, at least for purposes of liability, as
irrelevant. (They should not treat it as irrelevant for purposes of damages because in those
states where wage payment laws exist, remedies in addition to those available under contract
law are available to prevailing plaintiffs). For instance, in Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture
Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1995), a case involving allegations of employment
discrimination and wrongfully withheld commissions, the court did not address the
employee/contractor question until after it had resolved the commission claims against the
plaintiff and moved on to consideration of the discrimination claims. Then it noted in a
footnote: "[Defendant] Norwalk argues on appeal that Gadsby was not an 'employee'
protected by the ADEA. Because we find that Gadsby neither presented direct or
circumstantial evidence of discrimination nor made out a prima facie case, we need not
reach Norwalk's argument." Id. at 1330 n.2. Similarly, in Willis v. Champlain Cable
Corp., 748 P.2d 621 (1988), the court considered the effect of a thirty-day termination
provision on an individual's right to post-termination commissions. There the court implied
that the plaintiff was a contractor by noting that "[t]he plaintiff, [was] in business as a
manufacturers' sales representative, and ... represented manufacturers other than just the
defendant." Id. at 748. However, the court never specifically called the plaintiff a
contractor and utilized language throughout its opinion as if the distinction was irrelevant.
It framed the issue in the case as follows: "If an employer, acting in accordance with the
terms of the employment contract, terminates an employee's employment, does a cause of
action nevertheless lie against the employer for recovery of sales commissions if the
employee is able to establish that the employer was motivated by 'bad faith'?" Id. at 752.
The question is whether the distinction between contractor and employee matters for
purposes of the thesis here, namely, that employer opportunism under commission
agreements should be restrainable by principles of fiduciary duty. A thorough treatment of
the question, an article in its own right, is beyond the scope of this Article. What can be
said is the case is more compelling for employees because of the wage payment laws, which
do not typically cover the earnings of contractors. If the public policy of those states where
there are wage payment statutes is the elimination of sharp wage payment practices, and if
commissions are defined as wages, it seems then to follow that the public policy proscribes
employer opportunism under sales commission agreements. That said, if the basis of a sales
employer's fiduciary duty is that it acts on behalf of such employees while exercising
discretion over their critical resources, there seems to be little justification to include
employees and exclude commission-earning contractors.
74. See Uniform Partnership Act § 202 (1997) (explaining that "the association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether
or not the persons intend to form a partnership").
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limited in scope or duration, such as the consummation of a single sale, and
do not incorporate, the business is a joint venture. 5 When they team up but
agree that at least one of the parties will run the business and at least one of
the others will limit her or their involvement to investing in the business
and participating in the profits, it is likely to be a limited partnership.76
Adding commission sales to the chart seems to complete some kind of
Linnaen 77 wheel: sales employees do not run the larger business but are
responsible for, and thereafter participate in the profits of, individual deals.
III. WAGE COLLECTION LAWS
In most states, claims for overdue wages, whether based upon fixed
wages or commissions, 78 are governed by wage collection statutes. 79 These
laws embody an acknowledgement of the importance of predictable
paychecks in the lives of working people8 ° and contain meaningful
disincentives for employers to withhold wages without just cause.
Typically such laws require that wages be paid on a periodic basis, usually
no less often than twice monthly. 8' They also forbid withholdings not
75. See Qayyum v. Morehouse Gen. Hosp., 874 So. 2d 371, 375 (La. App. 2004);
Miller v. Component Homes, Inc., 356 N.W.2d 213, 375 (Iowa 1984) (noting that "a joint
venture is defined as resulting from 'the undertaking of two or more persons to combine
their property or labor in the conduct of a particular line of trade or general business, for
joint profits, creating the status of partnership' (citation omitted)).
76. See Uniform Limited Partnership Act § 1 (1914) ("Limited Partnership defined. A
limited partnership is a partnership formed by two or more persons under the provisions of §
2, having as members one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The
limited partners as such shall not be bound by the obligations of the partnership."). The
point is qualified by the word "likely" because limited partnership is not a default status.
The business must register as a limited partnership in order to protect the limited partners
from the claims of creditors. Fujimoto v. Au, 19 P.3d 699, 737 (Haw. 2001).
77. Referring to Carolus Linnaeus, the 18th centuty Swedish biologist, often called the
father of taxonomy. He devised the standard system for naming, ranking, and classifying
organisms still used, albeit in modified form, today.
78. Some states, for example Michigan, have separate statutes governing overdue
commission claims. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2961 (1961). These laws do not provide
substantive rights that are meaningfully different from wage payment laws that define wages
to include sales commissions. For example, the Michigan law provides that "[t]he terms of
the contract between the principal and sales representative shall determine when a
commission becomes due." MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2961(2) (1961).
79. See Medex v. McCabe, 811 A.2d 297, 304 (Md. 2002) (noting that 42 states have
enacted wage payment laws).
80. See, e.g., Prachasaisoradej v. Ralph's Grocery Co., Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 514, 522
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that public policy implicit in wage payment law is prompt
payment of wages); Shaffer v. Ft. Henry Surgical Assoc., Inc. 599 S.E.2d 876, 881 (W. Va.
2004) (noting that purpose of wage payment law is to protect working people by assisting
them to collect wrongfully withheld wages). See also infra note 92 (describing legislative
history of wage payment laws).
81. See, e.g., ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 820.115/3 (West 1999) ("Every employer shall
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required by law or authorized by employees, particularly set-offs,82 and
require that an employee's last check be paid within a short time of her last
day of employment, ranging from a few days83 to a few weeks. 4 They
penalize employers who violate the law by imposing a range of penalties,
86depending upon jurisdiction, including fines,85 liquidated damages,
payment of the employee's attorneys fees,87 criminal sanctions88 and
personal liability for shareholders, corporate managers and other persons
who knowing violate the wage payment laws.
89
What the wage collection laws do not do, however, is take sides in
accrual disputes. They do not, in other words, provide employees with
substantive rights, but rather with a statutory remedy when the employer
has breached a contractual obligation to pay earned wages.90 The theory is
that the prospect of enhanced penalties will dissuade employers from
be required, at least semi-monthly, to pay every employee wages earned during the semi-
monthly pay period."); W. VA. CODE ANN., § 21-5-3 (LexisNexis 2002) ("Every [employer]
shall settle with its employees at least once in every two weeks").
82. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 91A-5 (West 1996) (stating that employers may not
deduct sums from wages unless authorized by law or by the employee); N.Y. LABOR LAW §
193 (McKinney 2000) (same).
83. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-4-104 (2005) (stating that employee must be paid
all wages owed no later than five days after discharge or resignation).
84. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 34:11-4.3 (West 2000) (explaining that final paycheck
must be tendered "not later than the regular payday for the pay period during which the
employee's termination... took place").
85. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-71g (West 2003) (describing fines for
violation of wage payment laws ranging from $200 to $5,000).
86. See, e.g., DEL. CODEANN. tit. 19 § 1103 (1995).
If an employer, without any reasonable grounds for dispute, fails to pay an
employee wages, as required under this chapter, the employer shall, in addition,
be liable to the employee for liquidated damages in the amount of 10 percent of
the unpaid wages for each day, except Sunday and legal holidays....
Id.
87. See, e.g., 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 260.9a(f) (1992) (stating that court shall award
reasonable attorneys' fees in addition to judgment for wages).
88. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149 § 150 (LexisNexis 1999) (describing criminal
sanctions for failing to pay wages).
89. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN., § 44-323(b) (2000) (stating that "any officer thereof or
any agent having the management of the corporation who knowingly permits the
corporation to engage in such violation [of the wage payment laws] shall be deemed the
employer for purposes of this act").
90. See Shortt v. New Milford Police Dep't, 562 A.2d 7, 14 (Conn. 1989) (noting that
wage payment law "does not embody substantive standards to determine the amount of
wages that are payable but provides penalties in order to deter employers from deferring
wage payments once they have accrued"); Harding v. Duquesne Light Co., 882 F.Supp. 422,
427-28 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (noting that the Pennsylvania wage payment law "does not create a
statutory right to wages; rather, 'it provides a statutory remedy when the employer breaches
a contractual right to earned wages.' It is the employment agreement between the parties
that controls in determining whether earned wages are due" (citation omitted)).
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engaging in sharp payment practices. 9' The scheme appears to work quite
well in the area of fixed wages where liability questions are rare and
deterrence is a simple matter of increasing the costs of non-compliance. It
is a less successful strategy when applied to the commission context, where
accrual disputes are common and enforcement less a question of available
remedies and more a question of available rights.92
Contract, as the source of accrual rights for sales commission
employees, is problematic for two reasons. The first is that commission
agreements simply cannot be prepared carefully enough to account for
every contingency. The sale of a product or service is an extremely
complex undertaking, requiring cooperation and integration across the
91. See Shortt, 562 A.2d at 13 (noting that penalties of wage payment law deter
wrongful withholding of wages); Ressler v. Jones Motor Co., 487 A.2d 424 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1985).
The policy of the statute is to aid an employe [sic] in the prompt collection of
compensation due him and to discourage an employer from using a position of
economic superiority as a lever to dissuade an employe [sic] from promptly
collecting his agreed compensation .... The smaller the amount of the unpaid
compensation the greater is the need for assistance in effecting collection.
Id. at 429 (quoting State ex rel. Nilsen v. Oregon State Motor Ass'n., 432 P.2d 512, 515
(1967)).
92. Accrual disputes in the fixed compensation setting are very rare outside of disputes
that concern non-wage forms of compensation, such as accrued vacation and holiday pay,
which are also defined as "wages" under most wage payment laws. See, e.g., Harding, 882
F.Supp at 425 (pursuing a claim for vacation pay under Pennsylvania wage payment law);
Holmes v. Unified School Dist. No. 259, 46 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Kan. 2002) (concerning
accrual dispute over holiday pay under Kansas wage payment law). Accrual disputes over
wages are rare because, as noted earlier in this Article, there are seldom serious questions
about whether the employee was or was not at work. There are few defenses to wage claims
if the employee was at work and the amount of the agreed-upon wage is seldom a point of
disagreement. Accrual disputes in the commission area are extremely common and come in
an infinite variety of fact patterns. Some of the general categories are: disputes over
whether the employee has met all of the conditions precedent to a commission, see, e.g.,
Thompson v. Direct Impact Co., 63 F.Supp. 2d 721 (E.D. Va. 1998) (holding ambiguous a
commission agreement that provided that commission only earned when revenue from sale
is collected during employee's employment); conflicts between employees over
commissions, see, e.g., Petronella ex rel Richardson v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., No. CV
940544040S, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2753 at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 1997)
(providing an example where a manager argued that she, and not her subordinate, is entitled
to a commission); whether employers may unilaterally amend commission agreements to
make them less lucrative to their employee, see, e.g., Barlow v. M.J. Waterman & Assoc.,
Inc., No. 206929, 2000 WL 33418958 (Mich. Ct. App. May 30, 2000) (discussing an
employer who unilaterally changed his method for paying commissions); and whether and
to what extent employees are entitled to be paid commissions that accrue after termination,
see, e.g., Finsterwald-Maiden v. AAA S. Cent. Ohio, 685 N.E.2d 786 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
(explaining that an employer may not rely upon post-employment commissions limitation
contained, not within commission agreement, but within employee handbook specifically
stating that it is not to be construed as contract).
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entire spectrum of an organization's management and operations structure.9 3
If the product is poorly made, often delivered late or too expensive, it will
be hard to sell.94 When it is sold, it is often difficult to ascribe a procuring
cause, it not infrequently being the case that numerous individuals
contributed to the effort, some employed on a commission basis, some not,
or that dumb luck was the causative factor. 95 It is literally impossible to
draft an agreement that will cover each possible circumstance under which
it is reasonable to make an adjustment, up, down, or sideways, 96
particularly if the object is to be fair to all parties.
The second problem is that as a source of substantive rights, contract
law is poorly suited to the protection of interests that emanate from the
employment relationship because of the enormous weight and influence of
the at will rule. Because of the at-will rule, courts accept opportunism as
the employer's birthright, even when the agreement concerns matters other
than job security. When a literal interpretation of a commission agreement
would permit an employer to treat an employee unfairly the result is simply
unfair in the way that at-will determinations are often unfair, regrettable but
not actionable. 97 When a gap or ambiguity in a commission agreement
causes uncertainty, presumably providing the court with greater leeway to
do what is fair, what it often does instead is conclude that the employer
intended to reserve its traditional prerogatives.98
The problem with literalist interpretations of unambiguous contracts is
that such interpretations often fail to consider that the agreements may be
93. STANTON & BusKRK, supra note 48, at 11-13 (noting that the successful marketing
of a product requires coordination across all corporate departments).
94. Id. at 297-98.
Compensation should be based only on those items that are controllable by the
salesmen and can be measured. However meritorious, this step is an ideal and
virtually impossible to implement completely.... Most factors contributing to
sales success are controllable only partially or not at all by the salesman. A
salesperson has some control over his sales volume, for instance, but this
control is limited by product attributes and company pricing policies. A man
may have considerable control of his missionary sales work, but the quality of
the point-of-purchase promotional materials are not controllable by him; yet,
they affect his success.
Id.
95. A recurring problem is how to contend with windfall sales generating undeserved
commissions. Beyond advising that adjustments be made, the sales compensation literature
is very lean on concrete proposals for suitable contract language. See, e.g., DUNN, JOHNSON
& KuRTZ, supra note 64 at 422. ("An essential element for any sales compensation plan is
equity. The plan must be fair to both the company and its salesmen. The company should
be able to keep selling costs in line with volume. The compensation plan should also
protect against windfall gains to salesmen in abnormal times.").
96. "Sideways" is meant as an adjustment of commissions between employees.
97. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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illusory or unconscionable. When a court begins its analysis of a so-called
"clear" contract by describing the at-will rule, effectively nothing that it
describes thereafter can be illusory or unconscionable because the court has
accepted, as a matter bedrock principle, that the employee has no right to
expect anything other than bad faith and ill treatment.99 When courts
utilize the at-will rule to interpret unclear contracts, the effect is even more
pernicious. 00 Accrual disputes usually involve unclear contracts (drafted
by employers) and challenges to an employer's common law prerogatives.
When a court uses the at-will rule as an interpretative device to ascertain
the meaning of a commission agreement, circularity is created: the
employer's common law prerogatives are used as a guide for determining
how such prerogatives have been altered by contract. In those jurisdictions
where that sort of circularity has become entrenched in the case law, there
are no incentives to draft clear agreements and little incentive to pay
commissions that are at all susceptible to challenge.
One such jurisdiction is New York, where courts have recognized
something called the "post-discharge commissions rule." That rule
provides that "[a]n at-will sales representative is entitled to post-discharge
commissions 'only if the parties expressly provided for such
compensation. "'"'  Operation of the rule is illustrated by the court's
holding in Swits v. New York Systems Exchange, Inc. 102 In Swits, the
plaintiff was a sales employee who was terminated from her job leasing
computer equipment. Her commission agreement required the employer to
pay her commissions on all leases and lease extensions, with no express
limit on the number or duration of lease extensions from a single client.
99. See, e.g., Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d 621, 627 (Wash. 1988)
(noting, after an extended homage to the at-will rule, that "[w]e also would decline to
modify the express terms of a written contract agreed to by competent parties. This case
raises no implications of overreaching, unconscionability or illegality"). The court might
have felt differently had it approached the problem by worrying that the employee had
invested a substantial amount of time wooing one potential customer, only to have the rug
pulled out on him before the deal was consummated. Such would be the case under
partnership law, where a clause that permitted the partnership to expel a partner on thirty
days notice would likely be enforceable but a provision that allowed the partnership to
divest an expelled partner of his interest in a big business deal would not be. See Gelder
Med. Group v. Webber, 363 N.E.2d 573, 576 (N.Y. 1977) (noting that expulsion clauses in
partnership agreements are enforceable so long as they do not effect forfeiture).
100. The effect is more pernicious because the clear meaning of the contract is hidden.
At least it can be argued that by following the text of an unfair contract, the employer did
nothing of which the employee was not aware of nor reasonably placed upon notice about.
101. Swits v. N.Y. Sys. Exch., Inc., 722 N.Y.S.2d 300, 302 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
(quoting Production Prod. Co. v. Vision Corp., 706 N.Y.S.2d 289 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)).
See also Frishberg v. Esprit De Corp., 778 F.Supp. 793, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing
relevant New York cases on post-termination commissions rule).
102. Swits, 722 N.Y.S.2d at 302.
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The plaintiff was discharged and sought commissions for lease extensions
that were placed with her clients after her dismissal.
Summary judgment was entered in favor of the employer, and the
plaintiff appealed. The appellate court affirmed. Although the appellate
court's opinion suggests that the plaintiff possessed extrinsic evidence that
might bear on the intent of the parties with regard to post-termination
commissions, °3 the court viewed such evidence as irrelevant because it was
not expressly within the commission agreement itself. In the absence of
such express language to the contrary, the court held, the post-termination
commissions rule is "dispositive."' 4
The irony, of course, is that by the express language of the agreement,
the right to commissions did not expire upon the termination of the
plaintiffs employment. What the New York rule presumes is that within
the context of a relationship terminable at will, no rational employer would
fail to exercise its prerogative to stop paying commissions at the moment
the employee's services were terminated.0 5 The onus is therefore shifted
to the employee to establish by unmistakable terms that the agreement
contemplated an action on the employer's part that was not in keeping with
its common law prerogatives.
By using the at-will rule as an interpretative device in commission
disputes, courts misapply the default rule for job security rights to the
resolution of wage claims, thus limiting the ability to contest an employer's
exercise of discretion as unjust or contrary to the probable intent of a
commission agreement. Furthermore, courts create an end-point to the
103. Id. (describing the plaintiff arguing that the parol evidence of the intent of the
parties should be permitted to defeat the employer's motion for summary judgment).
104. Id. at 302 ("[S]ince ... [the post-termination commission rule] is dispositive, it is
unnecessary to address either the parol evidence or Statue of Frauds issues.").
105. The post-discharge commission rule in New York is of early origins. In one of its
first explications, Scott v. Eng'g News Pub. Co., 62 N.Y.S. 609, 610 (N.Y. App. Div. 1900),
the court suggested that when an at-will employment ends, it is far fetched to think of future
orders as belonging to the terminated salesman because it is tantamount to repudiation of the
at will rule.
If the plaintiff is right, then these customers were perpetually his, and they
could never, in any contemplated business relation to the defendant, get away
from him. He would have more than a life enjoyment with respect to business
emanating from them to the defendant; for the right to commissions, as now
claimed, would upon his death undoubtedly go to his legal representatives.
Id. Along the way courts began to suggest that the rule could be altered by contract,
although no evidence can be found that this had been done to the satisfaction of any court.
An early example of a court presuming that the rule could be amended by contract is
Pelletier v. Dobbins-Trinity Coal, Inc., 59 N.Y.S.2d 676, 676 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945), which,
in the inimitable style of the New York appellate courts, is a one-sentence opinion: "In a
hiring at will plaintiff is not entitled to commissions on deliveries made subsequent to the
date of his discharge, in the absence of the showing of any agreement as to such
commissions."
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collection of commissions that, while perhaps sensible in the fixed wage
context, is both artificial and extremely unfair given the manner in which
commission earnings accrue. 10 6 And finally, courts fail to fulfill the public
policy that supports facilitation of all wage claims, contingent or fixed.'0 7
Two published decisions, Yearwood v. Southern Life Systems, Inc. 108
and Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp.,109 are particularly illustrative of
the phenomenon that has been described, and these cases provide templates
for consideration of solutions that are proposed in the concluding sections
of this paper.
IV. Two CASES
In Yearwood, the plaintiff was a commission sales employee who sold
reusable thermometers to hospitals and other health care providers. The
"product" was actually composed of two items: the thermometer itself and
a disposable probe cover, which was purchased on an after-market basis.
Customers bought the thermometer on contracts, called SPAs (System
Placement Agreements), that required the customers to buy the disposable
probe covers for up to five years. The SPAs also required the employer to
provide the customer with certain follow-up services such as training and
product maintenance.
The plaintiffs commission agreement was described by the court as
follows:
The commission agreements provided that district managers who
sold thermometers under SPAs would receive commissions from
Southern in two ways. For the customer's initial purchase of the
thermometers and entry into the SPA, a manager received a
commission of 30 percent of the company's gross profit. For
disposable probe covers sold to the customer during the term of
the SPA, another commission of between 28 percent and 32
percent of gross profits was payable. Under the commission
agreements, commissions were due on the fifteenth of each
106. Compare, for example, with the default in partnership: "[a] partner has been held
entitled to his proportionate share of the net profits realized on the completion of projects
which were commenced or planned prior to the dissolution of the partnership, including
commissions payable to the partnership for its services despite their accrual after
dissolution." Wellington Sys., Inc. v. Redding Group, Inc., 714 A.2d 21, 32, (Conn. App.
Ct. 1998) (citing 59A AM. JuR. 2D Partnership § 1034 (1987)).
107. See supra note 73, where the following syllogism is offered: If the public policy of
the states where there are wage payment laws is the elimination of sharp wage payment
practices, and if commissions are defined as wages in such laws, it follows that the public
policy in wage payment states is the restraint of employer opportunism under sales
commission agreements.
108. 531 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)
109. 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1996).
SALES COMMISSION AGREEMENTS
month based on "items paid by customers" through the end of the
previous month. The agreements also provided that "this plan
can be modified at any time by the corporation."
'"10
During the plaintiffs employment, his employer sold all of the SPAs
to a third party for $1,550,000. Because of this sale, plaintiff was
discharged and told that his right to receive commission payments on future
sales of probe covers was extinguished. The plaintiff sued in Georgia State
Court on a conversion theory, alleging "entitlement to a pro rata share of
the proceeds from the sale of the accounts."'' The trial court granted the
employer's motion for summary judgment.
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals framed the issue as one
involving straightforward at-will principles. Was the plaintiff seeking
payment for something he sold or something he hoped to sell in the future?
If his claim was for commission credit for something he already sold, it
would be based upon services rendered and thus cognizable as a wage
payment claim. If, however, the claim sought credit for something that
plaintiff had yet to sell, if, in other words, the probe covers were not "sold"
upon the execution of the SPAs, the claim would be tantamount to an
assertion that plaintiff was entitled to provide future services, a notion
barred by the employment at will rule." 12
The court held that the claim was for future services and thus affirmed
the judgment of the lower court. In reaching its conclusion, the court relied
upon two of the employer's past practices. The first was its practice of
transferring employees away from accounts that they had originated and
only paying commissions on probe covers to the sales employee assigned
to the account at any given time, regardless of whether such employee sold
the thermometer in the first place. The second was that "district managers
who left the company did not thereafter receive commission payments."
'"13
Because the plaintiff acknowledged during his deposition that he was
aware of those practices, the court ruled that he sought payment for
services to be performed in the future and was thus barred from proceeding
110. Yearwood, 531 S.E.2d. at 742.
111. Id. at 742
112. Id. at 742-43.
113. Id. at 743. The court's complete analysis is as follows:
Yearwood's deposition testimony shows that the commission were earned based
on future services. His testimony establishes that commissions on sales of the
covers were paid to the district manager who serviced the account even if that
person did not originate the account. Moreover, Yearwood acknowledged that.
. [sales employees] who left the company's employ did not thereafter received
commission payments. Consequently, Yearwood has no entitlement to
commissions based on the sale of covers after his employment ended.
Therefore, Southern has no liability to Yearwood for unpaid commissions.
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with his case by the at-will rule.'
4
The opinion demonstrates the trap that is set for employees when
courts use the at-will rule as a principle of contract interpretation in
commission disputes. Yes, future cover orders were contingent upon
additional services to be provided by the employer. And yes, by selling the
long-term contracts en masse, the employer extinguished any ability
employees might have to be assigned to an account when the sales were
made. But how could it ever be said that the employee had no interest in
future commissions at the moment the long-term contracts were sold to a
third party? All of the contracts were obtained by the employer through the
efforts of commission sales employees, each of whom expected to receive
commissions on future sales. Even if the employer correctly interpreted its
commission agreements to allow it to reassign employees from account to
account, what remained unchanged was the employer's promise to pay
commissions to someone. By selling the cover contracts to a third party,
the employer avoided paying commissions to anyone, thereby reaping the
benefits of a commission driven sales force while avoiding its concomitant
costs.
The opinion also illustrates the degree of deference afforded to
employer discretion on matters that affect the ability of employees to earn
commissions. The commission agreement was obviously silent on two
questions: First, could the employer reassign employees away from
accounts in which they had sold the SPAs? In other words, could
employees be deprived of commissions from sale of the probe covers if
they had sold the thermometer? Second, could the employer deprive
employees of probe cover commissions after such employees were
terminated?" 5 The court based its conclusion that the employer could do
such things on the fact that it had done them, an absurdly circular bit of
reasoning and an example of how pernicious the at-will principle can be
when applied to commission disputes. 16
114. The court does not precisely explain why it viewed the admissions as dispositive.
The only logical conclusion is that it accepted the following syllogism: (1) the employer
does not pay commissions to employees who leave its employment and reserves the right to
move employees between accounts; (2) plaintiff knew about these practices; ergo (3)
plaintiff should have known that he did not earn commissions on cover sales until such
orders were placed by customers he was servicing at the time of the sale.
115. That conclusion may be surmised by the court's description of the agreement. It
notes that "[t]he commission agreements provided that district managers who sold
thermometers under SPAs would receive commissions in two ways," and then goes on to
describe the thermometer sale and the after-market sales of probe covers. Id. at 742. It is
submitted that if the agreement specifically permitted the employer to reassign employees
away from accounts that they initiated, or expressly stated that commission would not be
paid post-termination, the court would have viewed those details as significant enough to
describe.
116. But see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(4) (1981) (noting that
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In Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp.,"7 the defendant was a
furniture manufacturer and the plaintiff its only salesman in the Chicago
area. The facts suggest that the plaintiff was incredibly successful:
between 1984 when he was hired and 1990 when he was discharged he
increased annual sales in his territory from $779,000 to $4,800,000.l' By
written agreement, he received a straight 5% commission on all revenue
allocated to his territory, meaning that starting at a modest salary of some
$35,000, he built his position into one that paid him well over $200,000 per
year." 9 The agreement allowed either party to cancel it upon thirty days
notice. The job itself did not require the plaintiff to sell furniture. Rather,
it was his job to convince retailers to allocate floor space to the product so
that it could be seen and ordered by retail customers. Such customers
would order the furniture directly from the retail store, the retail store
would order the furniture from plaintiffs employer and plaintiff would be
paid his commissions on the tenth day of the month after the furniture was
shipped. As acknowledged by the court, once plaintiff procured the retail
space, his job was mostly complete.
120
In 1990, the employer exercised the thirty-day termination
provision. The employer's explanation for the termination was that the
plaintiff "had a problem with disclosing confidential information," had a
poor working relationship with a major client and had an abrasive
personality. 2 ' The plaintiff sued on a number of theories, including age
discrimination, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, restitution and
"where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with
knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other,
any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight
in the interpretation of the agreement"). The Yearwood opinion is silent on the question of
whether any employee ever objected to the practice of not paying post-termination
commissions or moving employees away from the income stream created by the initial sale
of the thermometer. Assuming that there was no evidence of such objections, it is not fair to
describe the past practice and course of performance evidence as determinative. First,
current employees would not have had a meaningful opportunity to object to a company's
post-termination policy until they were dismissed. As such, it is not reasonable to hold such
silence against the employee who filed suit in Yearwood. Second, the plaintiff in Yearwood
might not have objected to the practice of moving employees away from the income stream
created by thermometer sales because it did not happen to him or because he was moved to
accounts that were equally lucrative or beneficial. In any event, because the earlier moves
were to something, and the move created by the sale of accounts was to nothing, it is hardly
fair to conclude that the plaintiff acquiesced in the practice that resulted in his termination.
117. 71 F.3d 1324, 1326 (7th Cir. 1996).
118. Id.
119. Id. The court reports his income in 1990 as $235,000.
120. Id. The court described the selling effort as follows: "The salesman's job was
mainly complete once he had procured the floor space and placed the samples at the retail
store." Id.
121. Id.
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interference with prospective economic advantage. All of the claims were
dismissed by the trial court on the employer's motion for summary
judgment, a result that was subsequently affirmed by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The breach of contract claim largely turned on interpretation of the
thirty-day termination provision.1 22  The provision contemplated five
possible reasons for termination and described the employer's obligation to
pay post-termination commissions given each possibility. The court
described these provisions as follows:
1. Termination due to Gadsby's reaching age 70:
commissions paid 'on all orders entered prior to the date
of such termination.'
2. Termination due to Gadsby's death or insolvency or
bankruptcy: commissions paid 'on all orders which have
been entered on the books of the Company prior to such
termination....'
3. Termination due to Gadsby's disability or incapacity:
commissions paid 'on all orders which have been entered
on the books of the Company during the period of
disability or incapacity. .. '
4. Termination due to Gadsby's resignation: commissions
paid 'only on orders shipped.'
5. Termination by Norwalk: commissions paid 'on all
orders entered.' 1
23
The plaintiff argued that because he was terminated in accordance
with paragraph five, he was entitled to commissions as long as the floor
space he placed continued to generate orders. He based this argument on
the plain wording of the provision and a comparison of it to the others.
Specifically, he noted that while the first three provisions contained cutoff
dates for post-termination commissions, the fifth did not. As such, the
agreement evidenced the parties' intent that commissions would continue
to be paid on an on-going basis.
1 24
The court rejected that argument for three reasons. First, it noted that
"absent express language to contrary, a contract would not subject an
122. The plaintiff also alleged that he was entitled to commissions in accordance with
the so-called "procuring cause" doctrine. That doctrine provides that "in absence of a
contrary agreement, an agent is entitled to compensation from his principal for a transaction
of which the agent is the procuring cause." Id. at 1327. The Gadsby court held that the
doctrine was inapplicable there because the contract at issue contained a mechanism for
payment of commissions, and the procuring cause doctrine does not apply when the
agreement between the parties expressly provides for when commission will be paid. Id.
123. Id. at 1328 (internal citations omitted).
124. Id.
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employer to liability ad infinitum.'125  Second, it found plaintiffs
interpretation of the contract unpersuasive because it ignored important
clues to intent that could be derived from the contract's structure.
[T]he first three types of terminations are contained in separate
paragraphs, but the last two-termination by the company and by
Gadsby-are contained in a single paragraph, Paragraph (f),
which is immediately preceded by the provision that allows
termination with 30 days' notice. Thus Paragraph (e) tells the
parties how to terminate the Contract and Paragraph (f) tells the
parties how such a termination will affect commissions:
(e).... Either party to this agreement may terminate the same,
without reason, upon thirty (30) days' written notice in writing to
the other party.
(f) That if this agreement is terminated by resignation of the
Commission Sales Representative, the Company shall pay
commissions when and as earned only on orders shipped; if this
agreement is terminated by the Company, the Company shall pay
commissions when and as earned on all orders entered.
Read together, the absence of an express cutoff date in
Paragraph (f), unlike Paragraphs (g), (h), and (i), is perfectly
understandable: the cutoff date naturally flows from the 30-day
notice provision in the previous paragraph. After each clause in
Paragraph (f), the words 'during the 30-day period prior to
termination' is understood.
126
Additionally, the court noted that "Gadsby's argument makes the
express distinction in Paragraph (f) between 'orders shipped' and 'orders
entered' superfluous. ' 127 Because, by Gadsby's logic, the employer may
not limit post-termination commissions for employees who either resign or
are terminated, why distinguish between orders that are shipped and those
that are entered? The distinction only makes sense if tied to a cutoff date,
e.g., orders shipped within thirty days of termination or orders entered
within thirty days of termination. 
128
And finally, the court noted that the plaintiffs interpretation simply
fails to explain why the Contract would have been drafted to be
more generous to a sales representative who quits or is fired than
to one who retires, dies or experiences a disability. Common
sense dictates that an employment contract would, more likely
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1328-29.
127. Id. at 1329.
128. Id.
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than not, treat terminated employees and employees who quit
more harshly than those who discontinue their relationship with
the employer due to circumstances beyond their control.
129
The facts in Gadsby suggest that a commission sales employee built a
wildly successful territory, which, after it was built, could largely run itself
The court suggested that the employer became disenchanted with the sales
employee, but did not deem it necessary to explore the bases for that
disenchantment.130 It did not deem it necessary, in other words, to point out
the obvious, which is that it would be very easy to become disenchanted
with an employee who is paid over $200,000 per year to do little or no
work. Over time, there is simply no chance that the employer did not view
the commissions it was paying as a burden to it and a windfall to the
employee.3 There is little chance that it had not spent considerable time
129. Id.
130. The court described defendant's view of plaintiff's performance as follows:
There is substantial evidence that Norwalk was pleased with Gadsby's
performance until his termination in 1990, including increasingly high rankings
among Norwalk's salesmen and handwritten compliments from management.
Nonetheless, Norwalk claims that Gadsby lacked a good working relationship
with Smithe Furniture Company, a major Chicago account, and that Gadsby had
a problem with disclosing confidential information. Norwalk also claims that
Gadsby had an abrasive personality.
Id. at 1326.
The court's only evaluation of the employer's justification for the dismissal came in
two footnotes. In note 4, the court observes: "Gadsby's phenomenally high sales figures
for the Chicago area are almost entirely due to a single client: in 1990, of the $4,800,000 in
total sales, $4,268,106 was to Smithe Furniture." Id. at 1332. Then in note 5, the court
observes: "[t]he fact that such a high percentage of Gadsby's sales were to a single
customer,... makes his souring relationship with that customer a valid consideration for his
termination and helps to demonstrate why Gadsby's behavior in 1990, rather than 1989, is
so critical." Id. at 1333. Fair enough. But we are not told how the relationship soured and
whether the souring affected the amount of orders received by the employer through Smithe
furniture. The last point is the most significant because if the plaintiffs conduct did not
cause the employer to lose business, what the employer gains by dismissing the plaintiff is a
four million dollar account, for which it no longer must pay a salesman's commissions.
Under the theory of sales commission agreements advocated in this Article, the employer
would be free to terminate the sales employee in accordance with the at will rule as
modified or not by the agreement between the parties. What it would not be able to do is
what it was able to do here, both discharge the employee and deprive him of commissions
earned prior to termination.
13 1. The best evidence of this is that over five years after the plaintiff's discharge, when
the court was describing the facts in its written decision, it noted that "there is no evidence
that [the plaintiffs] responsibilities were shifted to or absorbed by other Norwalk sales
representatives." Id. at 1332. The fact that the plaintiff could not establish that he was
replaced was a problem for him with regard to his age discrimination claim; it led the court
to find that he failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Id. at 1333.
However, it is damning evidence that the employer acted opportunistically; it simply did not
need anyone to do what the plaintiff had done, and was content to keep the client for itself.
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and money planning its exit strategy before it actually terminated the
plaintiff's employment.
Gadsby is another example of a court applying a "post-termination
commission" presumption. 3 2 The court establishes at the very beginning
of its analysis the measure by which the plaintiffs claim will be judged:
"absent express language to the contrary, a contract would not subject an
employer to potential liability ad infinitum." '133 From that point, it was a
rather simple matter for the court to derive support for the defendant's
position from the structure of the contract. The agreement contemplated
five possible ways in which the contract could be terminated: (1) employee
reaching age seventy, (2) employee's death or bankruptcy, (3) employee's
incapacity, (4) employee's resignation and (5) employee's involuntary
termination. The first three described precisely how post-termination
commissions would be handled; the last two did not. However, the last two
provisions were preceded by a paragraph that either party could terminate
the agreement upon 30 days notice to the other. Ipso facto the cutoff for
commissions "naturally flows from the thirty-day notice provision in the
previous paragraph."'
134
It is submitted that the flow would not have seemed so natural had the
court applied an inherently less hostile rule of construction. Assume, for
example, that the post-termination commission rule was the converse of the
one applied by the court, to the effect that agreements that do not expressly
state that commissions cease upon termination of employment are deemed
to provide for continuation of commissions in accordance with the original
understanding of the parties.'35  Under such a rule, the "natural"
construction of the contract would have required the court to accept that the
30-day provision only answered the question of how much notice the
parties were required to give each other if they wished to terminate their
relationship, not whether the employer remained liable for post-termination
commissions. When the notice provision is read in conjunction with the
last two termination provisions, the contract clearly provides that the
employer must give Gadsby thirty days notice if it wished to terminate their
relationship and thereafter pay him on all orders entered from his territory.
What is important to point out here is that one party was getting
everything and one party was getting nothing. The court's holding seems
satisfying on some level, no doubt because of the sense that Gadsby had
It would certainly be a different case if the employee's accounts, and his huge commission
earnings, were shifted to another employee.
132. See discussion of Swits v. New York Systems Exchange, Inc.,supra Part III.
133. See Gadsby, 71 F.3d at 1328.
134. Id.
135. As it would be, for instance, under partnership law, see Wellington Sys., Inc. v.
Redding Group, Inc., 714 A.2d 21, 32 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (considering the termination
of a partnership agreement).
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lived long enough off the fat of the land. But this is a value judgment
based strictly on one's acceptance of the at-will principle as the final arbiter
of such disputes. Why, for instance, is it more sensible that a corporation
be permitted to fill orders without paying commissions ad infinitum and
wrong somehow for an employee to collect the commissions long after his
discharge? Also, how well does the opinion in Gadsby work if the
employee cannot be dismissed as a glutton? Instead of firing him after
years of making $200,000 per year for little work, the employer could have
terminated him after he had toiled for years in penury and finally landed a
big account."' The holding in Gadsby must stand on its application of the
rules of contract construction, not whether it is "fair" to one or the other of
the parties.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES
There has been a great deal of scholarship over the years on how
fiduciary duties are both created and distinguished from other obligations,
most notably those emanating from and limited by contract.'3 7 There is
little dispute on the basics: contract duties are created and defined by the
understanding between the parties; fiduciary duties are broader and are
formed when, by contract or otherwise, weaker parties place trust in
stronger parties with respect to things of value.138 Beyond what may be
described as the general rule is a world of observed phenomena comprised
of exceptions. For instance, some relationships of trust between weaker
and stronger parties are not deemed by courts to be fiduciary, as for
example the relationship between franchisor and franchisee.139 There are
also examples of courts imposing the duty on the weaker party, not the
136. See Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1988). In Willis, the
Supreme Court of Washington upheld just such a result. There, a sales employee was
instrumental in landing a big account. Before the new customer placed its first
commissionable order, the employer exercised its right under the commission agreement to
terminate the employee and the right to commissions upon thirty days notice. For an
extended discussion of Willis, see infra Part VII.
137. See generally, Smith, supra note 35, at 1421-31 (describing various attempts to
rationalize the law of fiduciary duty and provide insights into how fiduciary relationships
are created and distinguished from non-fiduciary relationships).
138. Id. at 1487-88 (describing differences between contract duties and those emanating
from contract). See also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close
Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1675, 1684 (1990) (noting that "[a] fiduciary relationship
is a relationship of power and dependency in which the dependent party relies upon the
power holder to conduct some aspect of a dependent's life over which the power holder has
been given and accepted responsibility.")
139. See Smith, supra note 35, at 1479-80 (discussing franchises and franchise
agreements).
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stronger. 4 ° Scholars have endeavored to create more nuanced theories for
fiduciary duties; theories that do a better job of explaining how fiduciary
duties are formed and how they are distinguished from obligations of a
non-fiduciary character.
141
Professor D. Gordon Smith proposes one such theory in an article
entitled "The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty.' ' 142 According to
Professor Smith, fiduciary relationships across the entire spectrum of
commercial and non-commercial settings within which they arise can be
said to share three attributes: (1) discretion reposed in one who (2) acts on
behalf of another (3) respecting a critical resource. 143  The theory is
particularly instructive here for three reasons. First, it purports to be
predictive in the case of relationships that meet the three criteria but fall
outside of established categories.' 44 Second, it helps to assign value to
contingent interests without requiring that such interests rise to the level of
"property," at least as that term is traditionally defined. 45 Finally, it helps
to explain why commission agreements give rise to fiduciary duties and
other wage contracts do not.
The three elements of the theory require some elaboration. Professor
Smith describes a critical resource as something belonging to another,
whether or not the thing "owned" can be categorized as "property."
The 'owner' of critical resources need not have legally
enforceable rights in the same way that an owner of property has
such rights, but she must have residual control rights that, at a
minimum, provide practical control over the resources. For
example, a lawyer's client may not have property rights in the
confidential information conveyed to. the lawyer, but the client
nevertheless controls the initial disclosure of that information. 1
46
The key to whether a thing can be described as a critical resource is not a
function of its intrinsic or extrinsic value but whether it "provides the
fiduciary with the occasion to act opportunistically."' 47 When a fiduciary
can harm the "owner" of the resource by misusing it, it is a critical
resource.
4 8
140. Id. at 1469-71 (arguing that although venture capitalists ordinarily have more
power than the entrepreneurs who accept their money, gaps in agreements between them
create opportunities for entrepreneurs to act opportunistically, which opportunism should be
subject to restraint by fiduciary duty).
141. Id. at 1421-31.
142. See Smith, supra note 35.
143. Id. at 1402.
144. Id at 1404.
145. Id. at 1403
146. Id. at 1444.
147. Id.
148. Id
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The discretion requirement measures the ability of the fiduciary to
cause harm to the "owner" of a critical resource. It is not enough that harm
be possible in the abstract; the fiduciary must have the "power to use or
work with the critical resource in a manner that exposes the beneficiary to
harm that cannot reasonably be evaded through self-help.' ' 49 The degree of
a fiduciary's power to use or work with the critical resource must reside
somewhere along the continuum between absolute and insignificant. 50 If
the power is absolute, then the allocation of discretion is a conveyance and
the beneficiary no longer an "owner."'' On the other end of the spectrum,
if the power is insubstantial, then the beneficiary cannot be said to be
exposed to harm, at least not a level of harm that cannot be reasonably
evaded through self-help.
5 2
The "on behalf of' requirement is the most abstract. 53 According to
Professor Smith, the requirement is clearly met when the fiduciary
represents the beneficiary in dealings with third parties or when the
fiduciary acts upon instructions received from the beneficiary, but such
examples do not constitute the only circumstances justifying a finding that
the requirement has been met. 5 4  Indeed, as Professor Smith concedes,
"relationships of every kind are formed in the hopes of conveying mutual
benefits," and "the most interesting behavior occurs in the absence of
explicit instructions."' 55 The key appears to be the understanding, whether
149. Id. at 1449.
150. Id. at 1448-49.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. The "on behalf of' requirement is the most abstract because it is less intuitive than
the others and harder to reconcile with observed phenomena. It is largely derived from the
law of agency. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 cmt. a (1958) (defining a
fiduciary as "a person having a duty, created by his undertaking, to act primarily for the
benefit of another in matters connected with his undertaking"). The partnership example
demonstrates how abstract the standard is. As Professor Robert W. Hillman notes, if
fiduciaries must act "primarily for the interest of another," partners are not fiduciaries.
Robert W. Hillman, Business Partners as Fiduciaries: Reflections on the Limits of
Doctrine, 22 CARDOZO L. REv. 51, 55 (2000). That is because partnerships are formed by
individuals hoping to realize individual gain. See id.
Assume, for example, a venture has a dollar of income to be allocated between
its two owners. May one owner claim a larger percentage, or even any
percentage at all, without doing violence to the notion of partner as fiduciary?
May the other partner resist the first partner's claim without running afoul of the
same fiduciary norms? These questions, of course, are rhetorical but do
illustrate the problem of applying a 'selfless' standard in a context where the
pursuit of private advantage not only is inevitable but, within limits, should also
be encouraged.
Id at 55-56.
154. Smith, supra note 35, at 1439.
155. Id.
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or not stated explicitly, that the putative fiduciary has assumed an
obligation on behalf of one who may therefore claim to be a beneficiary
and thus insist that the fiduciary refrain from self-interested behavior that
causes her harm. 15 6 In the absence of an assumed obligation, the law does
not interpose a broad duty to refrain from self-interested behavior and
leaves the parties to whatever self-help remedies exist, such as withdrawal
from the venture or litigation.
As an example of a relationship that meets all of the requirements of
fiduciary status save the "on behalf of' requirement, Professor Smith points
to the relationship between licensor and an exclusive licensee."' While the
individual obtaining an exclusive license may exercise discretion with
regard to a critical resource, such licensee does nothing on behalf of the
licensor.' 58 As such, the parties have an arms length relationship that is
governed by the terms of their contract and policed by their ability to
engage in self-help.159
The relationship between an employer and a sales commission
employee fits neatly into Professor Smith's conception of relationships that
are fiduciary. The critical resource, of course, is the employee's contingent
interest in sales commissions. That interest meets the test for critical
resource, not because the employee has a property right to a commission
that has yet to accrue, but, consistent with Professor Smith's theory,
156. This appears to be a fair synopsis of the requirement, but it is never put so directly
by Professor Smith. Apparently stumped by the riddle posed by Professor Hillman, see
Hillman, supra note 153, Professor Smith is content to provide examples of when the "on
behalf of' requirement will and will not be met (not met by arm's length contracts; is met by
employees who would steal business secrets), and does not attempt to provide a solution to
the problem in the abstract. Smith, supra note 35, at 1438-41. That solution appears to
come from one of Professor Smith's other observations:
The critical resource theory unifies fiduciary law behind the notion that all
fiduciary relationships conform to the structure described above, namely, that
the fiduciary acts on behalf of the beneficiary when exercising discretion with
respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary. Moreover, the critical
resource theory holds that the purpose of fiduciary duty is to combat
opportunism in such relationships. When combined, these insights imply that
the content of fiduciary duty should depend on the potential for opportunism,
which in turn depends on various aspects of the relationship structure. The
implication is that courts should calibrate fiduciary duties to the fit the situation
before them.
Id. at 1482 (emphasis added). So, too, it is argued, should they calibrate the showing
required for a finding that a putative fiduciary acts "on behalf of' a putative beneficiary.
Viewed thus, partners act on behalf of other partners situationally. For instance, a partner
may have self-interested motives for forming a partnership but acts on behalf of the
partnership when representing it in her dealings with third parties.
157. Smith, supra note 35, at 1440.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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because of the harm that the employer could visit upon the employee
through opportunistic behavior. 160 That harm is illustrated by the plight of
the plaintiffs in Yearwood and Gadsby. The employer can simply refuse to
pay, thereby divesting the employee of the resource entirely.
The employer also exercises discretion over the innumerable variables
that determine whether the employee ever reaps the benefit of her resource.
On the extreme end of the spectrum, the employer can utilize its discretion
to discharge the employee or sell her accounts, as the employers did in
Yearwood and Gadsby. Moving beyond discretionary acts that cause
immediate and rather obvious harm, however, are countless business and
administrative decisions that, while perhaps less visibly injurious to the
resource, affect the probabilities associated with commissions earnings,
decisions such as those related to quotas, commission rates, territory size,
customer credit, intra-firm conflict, account staffing and so on.161 What is
important to observe is that few of those decisions, large or small, are
subject to meaningful challenge by affected employees. 62 Or, as Professor
Smith would put it, few offer employees viable self-help alternatives. 63
And finally, the relationship between employers and sales commission
employees meets the somewhat abstract "acting on behalf of' requirement.
It must be conceded, however, that if the analysis founders, it founders
here. That is because employers do not act on behalf of sales employees in
the most obvious sense of that term, as would, for example, an attorney on
behalf of a client. Indeed, Professor Smith, referring to "employees"
generically and probably only thinking of the job security question,
pronounced that employers qua employers would not qualify as fiduciaries:
160. See id. at 1444 (noting that a critical resource need not be property but belong to the
beneficiary in the sense that the beneficiary will be harmed by opportunistic misuse of the
resource).
161. Trade publications that describe the process of administering commission plans
make the point. See e.g., Sales Management and Compensation Evolve in Competitive
Marketplace, Hewitt Study Shows; Talent Management Tops the List of Hot Issues in Sales
Industry, BusIEss WIRE, June 19, 2001 (describing a study of 224 large employers of sales
employees that found that employers used a variety of methods for establishing sales quotas
and 56% of them adjusted their quotas during the year); David Felder, Should You Adjust
Your Sales Compensation?: Sagging Economy May Cause Some HR Professionals to
Reconsider Pay Programs for Sales Personnel-Agenda: Compensation and Benefits, HR
MAGAZINE, Feb. 2002 (quoting compensation consultant who argues that companies should
take advantage of sagging economy to change terms and conditions of incentive plans).
162. See Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d 621, 624 (Wash. 1988) (noting that
an employer's interest in running his business "as he sees fit" outweighs an employee's
interest in job security).
163. Smith, supra note 35, at 1483 (noting that "[fiduciary duty] law provides protection
against opportunistic behavior, and the strength of that protection varies inversely with the
potential for self-help on the part of the vulnerable party").
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The critical resource theory of fiduciary duty rejects the notion
that employers should owe fiduciary duties to employees. If the
relevant resource is 'human capital,' there is no reason (in the
usual case) to suspect that an employer exercises discretion over
that resource on behalf of the employee. Like the landlord-tenant
case discussed above, this relationship meets the 'discretion'
requirement and the 'critical resource' requirement, but not the
'on behalf of requirement.1 64
It is by no means clear that Professor Smith would view the
relationship between employers and sales commission employees quite the
same. That is because unlike the relationship between an employer and an
employee paid on a time basis, particularly when the resource at issue is
job tenure, there is a strong argument that employers act on behalf of sales
employees with regard to the contingent interest in sales commissions. The
argument has two layers. The more obvious of the two observes that
employers collect money on behalf of those who are paid commissions.
Employees who work on a commission basis are assured a percentage of
the revenue or profit associated with a transaction or series of
transactions. 65  However, they have no right to collect their "share"
directly from customers. Instead, they must rely upon their employers to
send the bills, collect the proceeds, and divvy the monies properly. Under
fiduciary duty law, money collecting is a classic "on behalf of'
responsibility, undoubtedly because of the entruster's extreme vulnerability
to opportunism.166
The second layer observes that strictly on the question of the "on
behalf of' requirement, there are no fundamental differences 67 between the
164. Id. at 1456-57.
165. See BELCHER, supra note 2, at 311.
166. See People v. Leonard, 430 N.Y.S.2d 4, 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (noting that
lawyer acts in fiduciary capacity when collecting money for client); Am. Express v. Rossi, 4
Pa. D. & C.2d 760, 761-62 (Pa. C.P. 1955) (noting that fiduciary duty was created by trust
agreement in which parties selling money orders would account to issuer for sums
collected); Stames v. Texas, 929 S.W.2d 135, 137 (Tex. App. 1996) (holding that
"[a]ppellant's obligation to collect the money from each night's bingo game and deposit the
money fits both the legal and lay definition of a fiduciary function"). Money collecting is
often deemed a fiduciary obligation by statute. See Blumberg v. Coronet Ins. Co., 112 B.R.
236, 241 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (describing Illinois statute providing that "any money
which an insurance producer... receives... for soliciting, negotiating, [or] effecting ...
policies of insurance shall be held in a fiduciary capacity"); Abuteir v. Texas, No. 03-00-
00162-CV, 2000 WL 1784352, at *2 (Tex. App. 2000) (noting that under Texas statutes, "a
fiduciary relationship exists between the State, as principal, and [a] corporation, as agent,
for tax money that the corporation collects on behalf of the State").
167. There are, of course, differences in scope. In the course of running his business, it
cannot be said that everything the business owner does is done "on behalf of' his sales
employees. By contrast, it is arguably true that everything a partner does is done on behalf
of the partnership and his co-partners.
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way in which an employer of sales employees acts on behalf of such
employees and a partner acts on behalf of a partnership and her co-partners.
As Professor Smith notes, "The critical resource theory of fiduciary duty
describes the structure of relationships in which courts apply fiduciary
[duty] law. Partnerships fit easily within that structure, and courts
predictably impose fiduciary duties in the partnership context., 16' How,
then, does a partner act "on behalf of' a partnership?
The answer evokes some controversy. There are those who argue that
the only way that a partner acts on behalf of a partnership and her co-
partners is by exposing them to joint and several liabilities.1 69 To such
observers, it is the harm that can be caused by the partner vis-A-vis third
parties that justifies the imposition of fiduciary duties.
Under the critical resource theory of fiduciary duty, the strict
duties imposed in partnerships imply that partners are highly
vulnerable and incapable of adequate self-help. The source of
this vulnerability may be that partners have unlimited personal
liability for obligations of the partnership. This distinguishes
partners from shareholders in a corporation, whose liability is
limited.
1 70
The advantage to the "unlimited liability" or "mutual agency"
argument is that it is tangible and accounts for self-interest in
partnerships.17' The problem with describing partners as acting on behalf
of the partnership and co-partners is that it is fairer to state that partners
primarily act on behalf of themselves.172 The unlimited liability argument
solves that problem by pointing out that while partners are ordinarily self-
interested, their ability to expose others to harm means that they must be
charged with representing the organization and co-partners who will be
jointly and severally responsible for their actions.17 1 Of course, if the
unlimited liability theory is correct, the employers of sales employees are
not fiduciaries because sales employees are not subject to joint and several
liabilities.
But it is not a satisfying explanation, for at least two reasons. First, it
fails to explain why courts have imposed fiduciary obligations on
168. Smith, supra note 35, at 1458.
169. This is sometimes referred to as the "mutual agency" rationale. See J. Dennis
Hynes, Fiduciary Duties and RUPA: An Inquiry Into Freedom of Contract, 58 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 43 (1995) (noting that "[m]utual agency creates a relationship of trust
and confidence... because .. .[a] partner, as general agent, is entrusted with powers to
commit fellow partners to courses of action that sometimes involve the risk of major
liability and the commitment of substantial resources").
170. Smith, supra note 35, at 1484.
171. Hillman, supra note 153, at 55-56.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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shareholders in closely-held corporations and on members of limited
liability companies.1 4 Such individuals tend to interact like partners but do
not face unlimited responsibility for one another's actions.'75 Second, it
fails to explain the scope of a partner's fiduciary obligations. Fiduciary
duty in the partnership context is a two-fold responsibility: a duty of care
and a duty of loyalty. 76  The unlimited liability theory explains why
partners owe one another a duty of care, i.e., care to not cause third party
liabilities, 77 but not why they must be loyal, i.e., the obligation to be "other
regarding.' ' 178 The loyalty obligation suggests that third party liability is
only part of the story. 79 The other part, it is argued, has something to do
with the protection of a partner's reasonable expectations in the partnership
as a business investment.
Such is the insight of the so-called "morale mandate" explanation for
the imposition of fiduciary duty in partnerships. The concept has been
explained by Professor Robert W. Hillman:
The moral mandate approach promotes virtuous conduct in
business relationships. It is sometimes embraced without stated
justification, apparently on the theory that the reasons for
174. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass.
1975).
[B]ecause of the fundamental resemblance of the close corporation to the
partnership, the trust and confidence which are essential to this scale and
manner of enterprise, and the inherent danger to minority interests in the close
corporation, we hold that stockholders in the close corporation owe one another
substantially the same fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe to one another.
Id. at 515.
175. Id. See also Hillman, supra note 153, at 51-52 (noting that although joint and
several liability might justify a higher fiduciary standard for partners than for shareholders,
"[o]n the whole, however, the reasons for distinguishing fiduciary duties based on
associational form have not proven compelling").
176. See Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom
with the Need for Mandatory Restraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1622 (2004) (noting that "[i]n both partnership and corporate law,
fiduciary duties generally include both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty").
177. Id. (noting that "[t]he duty of care is generally regarded as the duty to be attentive
and informed before making a decision that affects the corporation").
178. See Smith, supra note 35, at 1406-07 (noting that duty of loyalty is a duty of
"unselfishness" or to behave as if one "has adopted an other-regarding preference
function").
179. It seems obvious that the duty of care has more to do with third party liability than
does the duty of loyalty. See Donald J. Weidner, Foreward to Freedom of Contract and
Fiduciary Duty: Organizing the Internal Relations of the Unincorporated Firm, 54 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 389, 392 (1997) (presenting synopsis of papers delivered at symposium, and
describing the views of Professor J. Dennis Hynes as including the belief that "third-party
liability is relevant to the duty of care, but not to the duty of loyalty, which turns on denial
of a benefit and on opportunistic seizure of assets, not on exposure to liabilities").
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promoting good conduct and punishing bad behavior are too
obvious to require articulation. Often, however, reasons are in
fact advanced. Most commonly, the moral mandate view is
justified along utilitarian lines as a necessary means of promoting
trust, an essential component of successful long-term business
relationships. On other occasions, support for the view is found
in the potential for inequity when bargaining power is unequal
and there is a need to prevent exploitation of co-owners who are
without power and trapped in unhappy business relationships. 180
Combing the two explanations described by Professor Hillman seems
to provide the best answer: power is often unequally distributed,
sometimes on a situational basis,"' and partners must be able trust one
another if the business is to succeed. Fiduciary duty, specifically the duty
of loyalty, is imposed to restrain partners from acting opportunistically as
they fulfill their acting "on behalf of' responsibilities.
8 2
A hypothetical helps to illustrate how partners act on behalf of other
partners and also how employers act on behalf of commission sales
employees. Consider the typical problem of an overdue receivable. A
partnership might delegate the responsibility to collect the debt to a
particular partner. In the usual case, a failure to aggressively pursue an
overdue invoice would not result in liability to the collecting partner, even
if the collector's defalcation caused cash flow problems for the
enterprise.'83 If the collector let the debt go long enough, and if debtor
subsequently became insolvent, there might be a plausible argument that
the collector had breached her duty of care. i8 4 No one would be claiming
that the collector acted disloyally.
Contrast that hypothetical with the case of a collector with a reason to
180. Hillman, supra note 153, at 54-55.
181. By "situational," it is meant that partnership duties must often be divided among
partners, and when partners are performing specific partnership functions, they are in a
position of situational superiority over those who must rely upon their skills and good will.
That differentiation of responsibilities is at the core of theoretical conceptions of "the firm."
According to Ronald Coase and other theorists, firms form in order to save money on
transaction costs. See Smith, supra note 35, at 1432-38 (discussing the firm theories
argued by Coase, Williamson, and others). Fiduciary duty arises in such settings because
human beings are naturally opportunistic and operating agreements cannot be drawn
carefully enough to restrain such behavior. Id. at 1433-38.
182. Professor Smith is not to the contrary. See id. at 1407 ("'[F]iduciary duty' connotes
an obligation to refrain from self-interested behavior that constitutes a wrong to the
beneficiary as a result of the fiduciary exercising discretion with respect to the beneficiary's
critical resources.").
183. See Miller, supra note 176, at 1623 (noting that the duty of care applicable to the
conduct of decision makers, whether such decision makers are members of LLCs, directors
of corporations or general partners, requires a finding of gross negligence or willful
misconduct before such decision makers will be exposed to individual liability).
184. Id. at 1621-28.
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refrain from collecting, as for instance the imminent withdrawal from the
business of a partner and the ability of the collector to seize the
withdrawing partner's individual share. In that case the equation would be
quite different, mostly because of how we feel about the collector's
opportunism. The point is twofold. First, we would say that collector was
acting on behalf of the beneficiary with regard to the receivable thus
justifying the imposition of a duty. And second, it would not matter
whether the beneficiary was a partner or sales commission employee. In
either case we would view the collector as acting on behalf of the
beneficiary and causing injury through self-interested behavior.
The critical resource theory helps to explain why commission
agreements give rise to fiduciary duties while other wage contracts do not.
An interest in time-based wages is certainly a critical resource: an
employer could cause a great deal of harm to employees by refusing to pay
them. However, time-based wage agreements fail the discretion test. As
noted previously, if the employee was at work and at least going through
the motions of providing services, wages are due without regard to the
quality of such services or their objective or subjective usefulness.,
85
Almost nothing about the process is open to the employer's ex post
manipulation. Furthermore, opportunities for self-help are manifest. The
national scheme of wage payment laws requires prompt, cash payment of
wages and penalizes those employers who violate its mandates quite
harshly. 1
86
Time-based wage agreements also fail the "on behalf of' test-at least
for employees. They do not fail the test for employers. Employees act on
behalf of employers, and thus the courts have recognized that employees
owe their employers a duty of loyalty that restrains them from opportunistic
behavior during the employment relationship.Y8 7  The argument that
employers act on behalf of employees, at least in the usual case, is difficult
to support by application of mainstream conceptions of what it means to be
employed.
88
185. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
187. See Terry A. O'Neill, Employees' Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency
Debate, 25 CONN. L. REV. 681, 685 (1993) ("All employees owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty
to their employer-be the employer a sole proprietor, a partnership, a close corporation, or a
large, publicly traded corporation. No reciprocal duty of loyalty, however, runs from the
employer to its employees.").
188. But see Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts:
Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1242
(1991) (arguing that the firm-specific investments made by employees justifies conclusion
that enterprise exists as much for them as for shareholders); Katherine Van Wezel Stone,
Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON
L. REV. 45, 48 (1991) (arguing that as human capital investors in the firms for which they
work, employees should be entitled to protection against restructuring decisions that
20061
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V. SCOPE OF THE DUTY: THE PARTNERSHIP PARADIGM
As noted, partners owe fiduciary duties to co-partners and to their
partnerships. The classic description 189 of that duty is Benjamin Cardozo's:
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another . . . the
duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in
a workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden
to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something
stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone,
but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is the standard of
behavior.'90
The extent to which Judge Cardozo's soaring rhetoric is or in fact ever was
a correct statement of law is unclear.1 91 For many years, lawyers, judges
and scholars have debated what the pretty language means "on the
ground."'1 92  Opinion has tended to fall into two camps. The so-called
libertarians, also called contractarians, argue that Cardozo simply had it
wrong, that partnerships are not trusts but private contractual relationships
entered into by individuals who are able to take care of themselves.
193
Viewed thus, fiduciary duty is not an obligation that transcends the
understanding between the parties but an attempt to estimate what the
parties would have agreed to had they appreciated ex ante what divides
them ex post. According to Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel,
When the task is complex, when efforts will span a substantial
time,.., a detailed contract would be silly. When one party hires
the other's knowledge and expertise, there is not much they can
threaten such investments). Such views have not influenced courts. Despite the fact that
both articles cited in this note have been around for more than a decade, neither appears to
have been cited by a single court.
189. The postmodern description, not to the contrary of Cardozo's, is provided by David
Mamet: "'Hey . ..' No, fuck that, you just listen what I'm going to say: your partner
depends on you. Your partner... a man who's your 'partner' depends on you.., you have
to go with him and for him... or you're shit, you're shit, you can't exist alone." DAVrD
MAMET, GLENGARRY GLEN Ross 98 (1982).
190. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
191. Compare Hillman, supra note 153, at 53 (noting that "Meinhard has aged well"),
with John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
658 (1995) (describing Judge Cardozo's description of fiduciary duty in Meinhard as
"rhetorical excess" and chiding "indignant" courts that follow it without pausing to consider
"whether the underlying deal supports the level of fiduciary obligation that the court
invokes").
192. For descriptions of the debate between contractarians and anti-contractarians, see
McGinley, supra note 70, at 43-47; Donald J. Weidner & John W. Larson, The Revised
Uniform Partnership Act: The Reporters' Overview, 49 Bus. LAW. 1, 16-21 (1993); Hynes,
supra note 169, at 31-38.
193. See McGinley, supra note 70, at 43-44 (describing the proponents of free contract
as "libertarians" and "contractarians").
486
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write down .... A fiduciary relation is a contractual one charac-
terized by unusually high costs of specification and monitoring.
The duty of loyalty replaces detailed contractual terms.
194
Judge Posner has expressed similar views:
The concept of the duty of good faith like the concept of
fiduciary duty is a stab at approximating the terms the parties
would have negotiated had they foreseen the circumstances that
have given rise to their dispute. The parties want to minimize the
costs of performance. To the extent that a doctrine of good faith
designed to do this by reducing defensive expenditures is a
reasonable measure to this end, interpolating it into the contract
advances the parties' joint goal. 195
To contractarians, fiduciary duties are default rules, and when they conflict
with express provisions in the operating agreement, the contract ought to
control. 
96
Anti-contractarians, called parentalists by some, 197 argue that fiduciary
duties owed by partners should be both broad and non-waivable. 198 In the
view of such individuals, all partners are not alike, and by allowing
associating entrepreneurs to opt out of fiduciary duties, the law favors
partners with bargaining power over those without it, and favors those with
comparatively greater access to information over those who rely upon the
sophistication and good will of their joint adventurers.' 99
The Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA) was approved by the
membership of the American Law Institute in 1995.200 In it, a compromise
was attempted between the views of contractarians and anti-
contractarians. 20' First, the accountability rule from the much older
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) 202 was incorporated into RUPA verbatim:
194. See Langbein, supra note 191, at 657-58 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 426-27 (1993)).
195. Mkt. St. Assoc. v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 595 (7th Cir. 1991).
196. See Weidner & Larson, supra note 192, at 27 (noting that the libertarian approach
favors freedom of contract and fiduciary duties as merely default rules).
197. Id. (referring to anti-contractarians as "parentalists").
198. See McGinley, supra note 70, at 43-45 (discussing the views of anti-
contractarians).
199. See Hynes, supra note 169, at 43-46 (discussing the concerns expressed by those
favoring broad, non-waivable fiduciary duties).
200. See McGinley, supra note 70, at 43 (noting that American Law Institute approved
RUPA in 1995).
201. See Weidner & Larson, supra note 193, at 18 (describing RUPA's fiduciary duty
sections as a compromise "on an extraordinarily controversial topic").
202. For a history of the Uniform Partnership Act, see Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d
257, 267 n. 19 (10th Cir. 1987) (describing the fact that work began on the UPA in 1902, it
was completed in 1914, and it was adopted by forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia by 1984).
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Section 21: Partner Accountable as Fiduciary
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and
hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the con-
sent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the
formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any
use by him of its property.
203
Second, however, was the incorporation of two rules that had not been in
UPA.204  The first provided that a partnership agreement may not
"eliminate the duty of loyalty," "but the partners by agreement may
identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty
of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable., 205 The second provided that the
partnership agreement may not eliminate the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing, "but the partners by agreement may determine the standards
by which the performance of the obligation is measured, if the standards
are not manifestly unreasonable. 2 6
Together the sections described above establish the boundaries of
permissible self-interest for those who choose, by design or default, the
partnership form. The underlying requirement is that parties be both fair
and loyal. Those broad principles may be modified by agreement, but only
to the point that they are not manifestly unreasonable. The onus, therefore,
is placed upon the partner claiming a greater share than might be expected
by operation of the default to incorporate her expectations into the
operating agreement, or accept de novo review by a court.20 7 Even when
partners have the bargaining leverage or relative sophistication to impose
one-sided terms or conditions, such actions are subject to challenge under
the rubric of manifest unreasonableness.
It is possible to argue that RUPA constitutes a contractarian victory or
an anti-contractarian victory,2 8 a debate that need not be joined in this
paper. What is argued here is that RUPA's fiduciary rules constitute a
203. Uniform Partnership Act § 21 (1997).
204. See Weiner & Larson, supra note 193, at 18 (describing the fiduciary duty sections
of the RUPA).
205. Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 404(b) (2004).
206. Revised Uniform Partnership Act § 404(c) (2004).
207. See Richard A. Booth, Fiduciary Duty, Contract, and Waiver in Partnerships and
Limited Liability Companies, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 55, 61 (1997) (arguing that
the RUPA's fiduciary rules place the burden on those who wish to retain the right to act
self-interestedly to obtain specific waivers from would-be partners).
208. Compare McGinley, supra note 70, at 45 (implying the contractarians won as "there
is no question that RUPA increased the ability of partners to contract out of certain fiduciary
responsibilities") with Hynes, supra note 169, at 31 (implying that contractarians did not
win because "RUPA endorses too great an invasion of the principle of freedom of contract
among partners") and Weiner & Larson, supra note 193, at 28 (stating that "[p]erhaps the
fact that neither extreme is satisfied fully indicates a balanced approach that legislators will
recognize as a reasonable compromise on a difficult issue").
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sensible and efficacious model for restraining employer opportunism under
sales commission agreements. It is a sensible model because it is the
product of a century's worth of considered judgment on how best to police
opportunism when operating agreements cannot be drawn broadly or
carefully enough, when remuneration is delayed and when investors must
rely upon the good faith and loyalty of co-adventurers.2 °9 Of course, one
could argue that the standard does not go far enough and that too much
authority will continue to reside with employers at the drafting stage of the
relationship when those with greater bargaining power and access to
information do a good deal of their mischief.210 Sticking for the moment
with the "sensible" part of the prospectus, it seems that there are at least
two reasons to favor the RUPA approach.
First, should consensus ever develop around the idea that sales
commissions are different than other wages, and thus entitled to greater (or
at least different) protections than they are afforded at present, it can be
anticipated that opinion will divide into contractarian and anti-contractarian
elements, much as it has in other business settings.21' Accepting RUPA as
the standard cuts to the chase, as it were, and perhaps makes the fiduciary
duty argument more palatable to those who could otherwise be counted on
to oppose it.
212
209. By describing RUPA as considered judgment, it is not suggested that it constitutes
consensus. To the contrary, the legal literature on RUPA is almost universally gloomy and
pessimistic. See, e.g., Allan W. Vestal, Advancing the Search for Compromise: A Response
to Professor Hynes, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (1995) (describing the unhappiness of
both camps with RUPA). But see Booth, supra note 207, at 55 (describing RUPA as
"eminently sound"). RUPA is, however, a compromise, and as Edmund Burke said of such
things: "all government-indeed, every human benefit and enjoyment, every virtue and
prudent act-is founded on compromise and barter." Edmund Burke, Speech on
Conciliation of America (Mar. 22, 1775) (transcript available in the University of
Pennsylvania Law School Library).
210. See Mara Kent, "Forced" v. Compulsory Arbitration of Civil Rights Claims, 23
LAW & INEQ. 95, 115 (noting that the inequality of bargaining power between employer and
employee is particularly acute in the pre-contract phase, when the employer "holds all the
cards").
211. It is of course important to point out that the contractarian debate is not limited to
partnership law. It arose in the more general corporate law context and appears to divide
scholars whenever the relationship between associating entrepreneurs becomes topical. See
McGinley, supra note 70, at 44-45 (discussing the genesis of the contractarian debate);
Timothy L. Fort and Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a Global Environment:
The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 831-32 (2000)
(describing the history of the contractarian debate as consuming a substantial portion of the
twentieth century and featuring the views of "corporate theorists as to whether a corporation
should be considered a natural entity with responsibilities for its stakeholders or a web
resulting from a nexus of contracts among self-interested individuals").
212. In other words, the same argument is made here that was made by Dean Weidner.
See Weidner & Larson, supra note 193, at 28 (observing that "[p]erhaps the fact that neither
extreme is satisfied fully indicates a balanced approach that legislators will recognize as a
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Second, while it is fair to observe that sales employees on average
have less access to information and less bargaining leverage than
partners-thus perhaps justifying imposition of a broader duty of
loyaltyl 3-there is also a countervailing sense that commissions are more a
creature of contract than are partnership profits (wages being the return on
investment expected by employees and profits being the return on
investment expected by partners). Under partnership law, the presumption
is that all partners share in profits equally, but this presumption can be
altered by contract. 14 There is no presumption governing how much to pay
in commissions, and if there is a parallel to the partnership default rule
concerning profits, it is that the wage payment laws express the policy
choice that the amount of commissions to pay be left to the agreement
between the parties." 5 Thus, more deference should be applied to the
interpretation of the terms of a commission agreement, express or implied,
than to analogous provisions of a partnership agreement, and if the relative
lack of power of sales employees suggests that fiduciary duties be broader
under sales commission agreements than under partnership agreements, the
policy choice that employers not be told how much to pay in commissions
pushes the matter back the other way. RUPA emerges as the middle
course.
Which brings the argument to the question of efficacy. The RUPA
standard would provide employers with wide berth to establish commission
accrual mechanisms, subject only to the condition that they not be
manifestly unreasonable and thus a violation of fiduciary duty. However, it
would also reform the law in two ways that would be of incalculable value
to sales employees. First, it would effectively switch the default rule from
compensation at will to fiduciary duty,2 16 meaning that employer
opportunism would no longer enjoy protected status, and unclear
agreements would no longer be interpreted as if employers intended to
preserve their tradition prerogatives. And, second, a standard of
unconscionability would emerge for evaluating clear agreements that
would serve as a counterbalance to pre-contractual opportunism.
reasonable compromise on a difficult issue").
213. See Kent, supra note 210, at 115 (noting that bargaining power is unequal between
employees and employers, especially pre-contract).
214. Uniform Partnership Act, § 7(4) (1997) ("The receipt by a person of a share of the
profits of a business is prima facie evidence that he is a partner in the business .... ).
215. See supra note 29 (describing the policy of the wage payment laws as supporting
the right to recovery of wages that have accrued, not to recover any sum in particular).
216. Switching the default rule from employment at will to something else is not a new
idea. See Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 106, 109 (2002)
(arguing that because of "endowment effect," switching default in employment law from
employment at will to just cause may result in additional rights for employees, questioning
so-called Coase theorem).
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It is not possible to catalog every application or ramification of a rule
that has not been adopted by any legislature and does appear to have been
considered by a single court.217 Some of its applications are considered by
revisiting the Yearwooda 18 and Gadsby2 19 cases.
VI. Two CASES-REDUX
Yearwood can be described as having involved three discretionary acts
on the part of the employer. The first was its practice of transferring
employees away from the income stream created by after-market sales of
probe covers. 220  The second was its practice of not paying employees
commissions on probe cover sales after such employees were terminated 2
And the third was its decision to sell all of the SAP accounts to a third
party.
22 2
Taking them in reverse order, there can be little doubt that under the
principle of law advocated here, the bulk sale of the SAP contracts, without
accounting for commissions, would be a prohibited action. That is because
by analogy to partnership law, the attempt by the fiduciary to claim such a
deal for itself would be viewed as the usurpation of an "opportunity '223 and
217. A fair question to ask is whether this Article seeks legislation or a reform to the
common law. The answer, perhaps not surprisingly, is either. RUPA's fiduciary duty
sections could be revised a bit and then readily incorporated into wage payment laws.
Beyond that, RUPA's fiduciary duty sections could be used by courts analogously. The
phrase "manifestly unreasonable" contained within RUPA was borrowed from the Uniform
Commercial Code, where it is used in a number places. Hynes, supra note 169, at 52.
Courts have frequently applied the Uniform Commercial Code in non-code cases when it
has been helpful to do so. See, e.g., New Eng. Yacht Sales Inc., Comm'n of Revenue Serv.,
504 A.2d 506, 509 (1986) (observing that the Court has "on a number of occasions ...
looked to the Uniform Commercial Code as a fruitful source of analogy."); Bd. of Managers
of the Vill. Ctr. Condo. Ass'n, v. Wilmette Partners, 760 N.E.2d 976, 980 (2001)
(describing non-code analogy to UCC). RUPA language, borrowed from the UCC, would
be easy to borrow again. Also, partnership law itself has a long history of being borrowed,
under circumstances very much akin to the way in which it is suggested that RUPA be used
here. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975)
(applying fiduciary law derived from partnership to close corporations).
218. Yearwood v. Southern Life Systems, Inc., 531 S.E.2d 741 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
219. Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324 (7th Cir. 1996).
220. Yearwood, 531 S.E.2d at 741.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. The "opportunity" concept is not limited to partnerships, but is applied in most
business settings where access to information and property is entrusted to fiduciaries who
are in a position to act opportunistically. See Victor Brudney & Robert Charles Clark, A
New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 997, 998 (1981) (noting that the
opportunity doctrine "provides that corporate fiduciaries cannot, without consent, divert and
exploit for their own benefit any opportunity that should be deemed an asset of the
corporation"); see also Kenneth J. Mickieqicz & C. Forbes Sargent, III, Demoulas v.
Demoulas Super Markets, Inc.: Directors' and Shareholders' Duty of Loyalty in Self-
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a violation (again by analogy) of the UPA's most basic conception of
fiduciary duty: the obligation to account to other partners for transactions
and property belonging to the partnership.224 Obviously the "opportunity"
concept would be far narrower in the sales setting than it is under general
partnership law. The presumption in partnership law is that all partners
participate in profits equally.225 Hence, in the absence of agreement to the
contrary, a partner need not have direct involvement in a money-making
transaction in order to expect payment of her commensurate share of the
profits.226 As long as a deal falls within the line of a partnership's business
interests, it will belong to the partnership and proportionate to equity, to the
partners themselves.227  Sales employees, by contrast, only reasonably
expect to be paid on business for which they are responsible. -Thus
opportunity, in the sense of a property interest in the revenues generated by
a business deal, is logically limited in the sales context to deals for which
the sales employee would have a reasonable expectation of earning a
commission.
So qualified, opportunity is a very useful way to evaluate the
employer's conduct in Yearwood. As an employment law problem, the
bulk sale question was awkward and difficult, for at least two distinct
reasons. First, it required the court to grapple with the thorny issue of past
versus future: If services were left to be provided under the SAPs before a
commission was earned, how could money be awarded to the employees
without a finding that they had a right to job security?22 Second, the bulk
sale was in essence the sale of a business, or at least part of a business.
How could the court find for the plaintiff without finding, at least
implicitly, that the employees had become owners-that at-will service had
evolved over time into something akin to an equity interest in the
Dealing Transactions Involving Corporate Opportunity, 42 BOSTON B.J. 16, 16-17 (1998)
(noting that opportunity doctrine is rooted in the duty of loyalty and the principle that
fiduciaries must subordinate individual interests to the well-being of the enterprise).
224. See UPA Section 21. See also Dennis J. Callahan, Medieval Church Norms and
Fiduciary Duties in Partnership, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 215, 262 (2004) (noting that Section
21 is a "proscription against self-dealing" and the UPA's "central duty of loyalty
provision").
225. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing partnership law).
226. See supra note 106 (discussing default presumptions in partnership law).
227. Id.
228. The court did not describe the issue as "thorny," "difficult," or even "interesting."
Rather, it viewed it as black and white: If the claim was for wages for work to be done in
the future, it was barred by the at will rule. If it was for wages for work performed in the
past, it was cognizable as a wage claim. Yearwood v. Southern Life Systems, Inc., 531
S.E.2d 741, 743 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). By describing what "the court" was forced to grapple
with, it is not meant that the Yearwood court grappled with any such thing. Rather, what is
visualized is a court that ultimately ruled the way the Yearwood court ruled but began the
process (given the sympathetic nature of his claims) hoping to rule in plaintiff's favor.
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company?229
It would be hard to find a more simple opportunity problem, which
carries none of employment law's baggage concerning the future or the
concept of sweat equity. 230 The employer obtained all of the SPAs upon
promises to pay probe cover commissions to someone. It then sold the
opportunity to service those contracts to a third party, thereby pocketing the
present value of that future right without paying commissions. In
summary, it usurped a business deal rightly belonging, pro rata, to all of the
sales employees who helped to create it-a problem with a name and a
solution under partnership law but of an uncertain status under employment
law.
The second discretionary act on the employer's part was its refusal to
pay commissions accruing after termination. Such a practice, certainly in
the absence of a clear agreement authorizing it, would be a breach of
fiduciary duty under partnership law231 and a breach of fiduciary duty under
the rule envisioned here. The more difficult question is whether clear
agreements purporting to incorporate the so-called post-termination
commissions rule would or should be enforceable. Undoubtedly the
question would engender controversy.232 Contractarians would argue for
the enforcement of agreements as written and anti-contractarians would
argue for the recognition of rules designed to protect employees from
229. Again, this is a description of a hypothetical court concerned about justice for the
plaintiff, yet troubled by the ramifications of a decision in plaintiffs favor; it is not
necessarily the Yearwood court itself. Indeed, the evidence that the Yearwood court actually
reflected on the philosophical issues raised by the case is dubious. For instance, it first
describes Mr. Yearwood's claim as seeking an entitlement to "a pro rata share of the
proceeds from the sale of the accounts." Id. at 742. Later in the opinion it recasts the claim:
"[A] question does arise about whether [the employer] breached its contractual obligation to
pay the commissions by selling the SPAs without obligating the purchaser to continue
commission payments." Id. at 743. Was the idea that employees could become owners so
abhorrent that the court simply revised the nature of the claim to avoid even having to
discuss the issue, i.e., finding it easier to imagine an obligation to provide for the employees
in the contract with the purchaser rather than account to them out of the proceeds of the
sale? Did the court simply not see the distinction? It is impossible to tell.
230. "Sweat equity" is the contribution to a partnership of labor instead of capital. See
Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36
HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REv. 79, 109 (2001) (arguing that partnership law ought to be applied to
cohabitation problems because "[p]artnership law offers a way to recognize the sweat equity
of the partner who contributes more labor than cash to the relationship"). Obviously, there
is no concept of sweat equity in employment law.
231. See supra note 222. The post-termination commissions rule is the opposite of the
opportunity concept. The fiduciary duty theory of commission sales agreements
contemplates the end of the post-terminations rule, at least as a default principle, and the use
of the opportunity concept for purposes of analyzing the relative interests of employers and
employees in commissions that accrue after termination.
232. For a description of contractarian and anti-contractarian debate, see discussion
supra Part V.
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"inceptional" '233 opportunism. One commentator has suggested that
whether a limitation on fiduciary duties passes muster under the RUPA's
"manifest unreasonableness" standard is a jury question. 34 That seems to
be the logical way to contend with the problem. By treating the question as
one of fact, courts will be able to evaluate post-termination provisions in
context, neither precluding nor sanctioning them as a matter of law.
The final discretionary act was the employer's practice of moving
employees away from the income stream created by their placement of
SPAs. The facts imply that the commission agreement was silent on the
question of whether or not the employees could be so moved, although it is
difficult to ascertain whether it was actually silent or simply rendered silent
by virtue of the court's bad description. Specifically, the court noted that
the agreement provided that sales employees would receive commissions
"in two ways": First, from the initial sale of the thermometer, and, second,
from subsequent orders of probe covers.2 35  Context is not provided to
allow the reader to determine whether the contract anticipated that both
commissions would belong to the same sales employee.
Assuming for purposes of analysis that the contract was truly silent on
the question, it is impossible to tell whether the employer's policy would
violate its duty of good faith and fair dealing. That is because it is
impossible to tell whether the employer's actions were opportunistic.
23 6
The opinion suggests that employees were transferred away from accounts
that they had initiated to other accounts. Money being fungible, employees
might have been adequately remunerated in their new accounts, and thus
not burdened unduly and without reason to complain. Furthermore, even if
some employees earned more money because of the practice and other
employees less, it is possible that the employer only benefited operationally
and earned no additional profits. Unlike the employer's bulk sale of the
contracts to a third party, where the promise was to pay commissions to
someone and the result was to pay them to no one, here all of the
commission money was paid, just arguably to the wrong employees. Under
233. Opportunism that arises before implementation of a business agreement is usually
termed "pre-contract" opportunism. See Kent, supra note 211, at 115. The term
"inceptional" opportunism is substituted here because while "pre-contract" is broadly
understood to cover all of the time antedating that magical moment when there is a meeting
of the minds, the term inceptional seems more readily understood to include the drafting
phase of the relationship.
234. See J. Dennis Hynes, Freedom of Contract, Fiduciary Duties, and Partnerships:
The Bargain Principle and the Law of Agency, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 439, 451 n.49
(1997) (noting that whether a limitation is manifestly unreasonable "seems to be when a jury
decides that it is").
235. Yearwood v. Southern Life Systems, Inc., 531 S.E.2d 741, 742 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
236. Smith, supra note 35, at 1409 (observing that the object of fiduciary duty is the
restraint of opportunism).
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such circumstances, it is likely the case that the employer had not acted
opportunistically and thus the employees' remedy, assuming that one exists
at all, would remain in contract.
The Gadsby decision illustrates the opportunism problem from a
different angle. In Yearwood, the employer's opportunism was stark. In
Gadsby, it is on some visceral level hard to decide who between the
employer and the employee was the bigger opportunist. If the employer
sought to stop paying commissions, the employee sought protection for a
near no-show job that paid him a significant six-figure income.
It is submitted that the visceral reaction to Mr. Gadsby's claims as
unseemly is caused by the fact that the law has no frame of reference for
passively earned wages. We certainly tolerate passive earnings of other
types, such as interest, dividends, stock appreciation and so on. When the
money being paid is called wages, however, the expectation is that sums
are being received for current services and the idea that someone could
receive remuneration for work performed long ago, perhaps long after the
employee has left her employment, is foreign and on some level distasteful.
That impulse, clearly the animating spirit of the Gadsby decision and the
post-termination commission rule, is borne of a failure to consider the
entrepreneurial aspects of sales commission employment and to separate
the wage question from the question of job security.
We do not know why Gadsby's employer chose the commission
method that it chose. We do not know, for instance, if placing floor space
was inordinately difficult, if the company lacked resources to pay someone
to do the work on a straight salary basis or if it simply designed its
commission program badly. What can be assumed is that the company
understood its business model, which was to get its product placed in retail
establishments and to fill orders as they came in through the retailers. As
such, it could have come as no surprise to the employer that the sales
employee's work was largely done after the floor space was arranged, and
thus it is curious that the employer chose a commission method that seems
better suited to a single sale of a product or service rather than the initiation
of an ongoing source of revenue.
In any event, the court was faced with a stark choice: either the
employee continued to collect his commissions for as long as his territory
generated revenue or he lost all rights upon thirty days notice. Based upon
the belief that infinite liability could not be presumed unless expressly
stated, and that the structure of the agreement better supported the
applicability of the termination provision, the court found for the employer.
By applying the fiduciary duty theory of sales commission
agreements, the court would have approached the problem quite differently.
First, it would not have been restrained by any presumption against infinite
liability. Indeed, partnership law makes precisely the opposite
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presumption, that in the absence of agreement to the contrary, a partner
must be paid her commensurate share of partnership profits whenever such
profits are realized.237  Beginning there, the court would have
acknowledged that the termination clause sought to answer not one
question but two: Under what circumstances could the parties terminate
their relationship? What then would become of post-termination commis-
sions? The first would be easy to answer: Upon thirty days notice. The
second was not answered by the clear language of the commission
agreement and thus resort would be made to the default rule: In the
absence of agreement to the contrary, the revenue generating accounts
constitute an opportunity belonging, proportionate to their equity interests
as established in the commission agreement, to the employer and the
employee.
Perhaps the most fascinating difference between a straight
employment law approach to the case and one animated by principles of
fiduciary duty is the analytic inversion of the comparator evidence. 23s It
will be recalled that the court viewed the plaintiffs inability to proffer
evidence that he had been replaced by a younger employee as fatal to his
age discrimination claim.239  Because opportunistic behavior is not
something that employment law seeks to regulate, the court never
considered that the same evidence, or rather lack of evidence, might help to
prove that the employer was motivated by self-interest. If the plaintiffs
poor relationship with a large client was the determinative factor in the
employer's decision to terminate him, one would expect to see that the
plaintiff was replaced by someone who could smooth things over. That the
employer apparently saw no need to do so even years after the termination
bolsters the view that all of the selling effort occurred before the employee
was fired, and that the decision to terminate him had less to do with
perceived harm to the employer's interests and more to do with the
employer's desire to get out from under an unfavorable commission
agreement.
237. See supra note 106 (describing the default situation of partnership law).
238. Comparators are individuals with whom the plaintiff compares herself for purposes
of establishing a disparate treatment discrimination claim. See Washington. v. Milton
Bradley Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 69, 78 (D. Mass. 2004) (discussing comparitor evidence in
context of discrimination claim).
239. Gadsby v. Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324, 1331 (7th Cir. 1996).
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VII. REFORM OF CONTRACT LAW VERSUS FIDUCIARY DUTY
Courts are slow to recognize new duties.24 ° The law finds it easier, on
balance, to create new remedies for existing claims and to broaden rights
with long historical antecedents than it does to acknowledge novel
principles of liability. 241 One can debate the degree to which this paper
proposes something novel; it can be argued that recognition of fiduciary
status is more akin to broadening sales employees' existing rights than
creating a new one from whole cloth.242 It would be hard to argue, however,
that fiduciary duty is the simplest answer and impossible to argue that it is
the only solution to the problems posed by employer opportunism.
Indeed, the simplest solution would be to reform the law of contracts.
Contract law's primary solution to the problem of opportunism is the
240. Often the cause is the doctrine of stare decisis. An eloquent explanation for that
phenomenon was provided by District Judge Mitchell H. Cohen in Caporossi v. Atlantic
City, New Jersey, 220 F.Supp. 508 (D.N.J. 1963), a case involving the recognition of tort
liability against a municipal entity.
When viewed against the panorama of legal history, it seems inevitable that
even with quickened enlightenment, responsive changes came more slowly and
often with tedious caution. This seems especially true in regard to anciently
venerated legal postulates which justify their continued existence on the
pragmatic needs of remote times and outmoded conditions rooted in ritualistic
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. Stare decisis, while a valuable and
well established doctrine, should serve as a flexible channel marker for
guidance and not as an immovable sand bar which may cause disaster; it should
not be permitted to foreclose re-analysis and re-evaluation of legal postulates,
which may have lost their vitalizing principle. If outmoded and artificial
distinctions are to persist in confining a court of law to a choice of specific
alternatives, one of which provides remedy for an injured individual, and the
other does not, then the choice of remedy seems clear as the demands of justice
must be obliged in each particular case.
Id at 521.
241. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 165-66 (1964) (Goldberg,
J. dissenting) (noting that allowing a new remedy is not affront to stare decisis as might be
creation of a new duty or standard of liability); Meller v. Heil Co., 745 F.2d 1297, 1305
(10th Cir. 1984) (holding that abolishing or creating new remedy does not create or impair
vested right or impose a new duty because "there is no such thing as a vested right in
remedies") (quoting Jefferson County Dep't of Social Services v. D.A.G., 607 P.2d 1004,
1006 (Colo. 1980)); Brian M. Hoffstadt, Common-Law Writs and Federal Common
Lawmaking on Collateral Review, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1423, 1491 (2002) (observing that
"creation of new rights presents far greater separation of powers and federalism concerns
than the creation of new remedies").
242. Contractarians posit that fiduciary duty is a subspecies of contract law. See
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 194, 427 (arguing that "'fiduciary' relation is a
contractual one characterized by unusually high costs of specification and monitoring ....
Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing"). If contractarians are
right, this paper proposes nothing more than a new twist on an old theme.
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing.243 Thoughtful examinations of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing suggest that it is theoretically broad
enough to proscribe most forms of sales employer opportunism:
The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is the
residual gap-filling default rule of contract law. It imposes limits
upon one contracting party's ability to negatively impact the
contract's value to the other contracting party. It determines
when a party may no longer pursue his own self-interest but must
instead engage in cooperative behavior by deferring to the other
party's contractual interests.244
Courts have utilized expansive interpretations of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to solve commission problems in the past,24' and it is
conceivable that the doctrine could be fortified to be more generally
useful. 246 Other contract doctrines, such as procuring cause doctrine247 or
243. See Thomas C. Cady & Georgia Lee Gates, Post Claim Underwriting, 102 W. VA.
L. REv. 809, 826-27 (2000) (noting that Judge Posner's observations that "the fundamental
purpose of contract law is to deter opportunism in the contractual relationship ... find their
way into the law of contracts through the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing"); Smith,
supra note 35, at 1487 (opining that the "judicial efforts to police opportunism in
contractual relations tend to be limited to the contract doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing"). Professor Smith describes the differences between fiduciary duty and the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing as follows:
[T]he duty of good faith is similar to fiduciary duty. Despite this similarity, the
scope of these two doctrines is sufficiently different that they are not often
viewed as tackling related problems. Fiduciary duty is typically more expansive
than contractual duty. While fiduciary duty is determined by the structure of the
relationship, the obligation of good faith and fair dealing emanates from the
terms of the contract. The varying intensity of these obligations is attributed to
the range of opportunistic behavior possible in each context. As noted above,
the intensity of fiduciary duty should depend on the likelihood of harm and the
potential magnitude of harm. Both the likelihood of harm and the potential
magnitude of harm are often less in an arm's-length contract than in a fiduciary
relationship because the allocation of residual control over the relevant
resources provides fewer opportunities for self-serving behavior. As a result,
the duty of good faith is typically weaker than fiduciary duty.
Id. at 1488-89 (emphasis in original).
244. Diamond & Foss, supra note 36, at 586.
245. See Caton v. Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 947 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that fact
question remained under California law whether employer opportunism that affected right to
post-termination commissions violated covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Wakefield
v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d. 109, 112 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a termination
motivated by intent to deprive employee of accrued commission violative of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing); Nolan v. Control Data Corp., 579 A.2d 1252, 1258 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that sales commission plan that allowed employer to make
revisions at any time without notice, prospectively and retroactively, violated covenant of
good faith and fair dealing).
246. By more "useful" it is meant applied by more courts to restrain employer
opportunism. However, the fate of early experiments do not give one much to hope for.
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the concept of quasi contract, 248 could also be pressed into wider service.
249
Two cases stand out in that regard: Wakefield v. Northern Telecommunications Inc., 769
F.2d 109 (2d. Cir 1985) and Ellis v. McKinnon Broadcasting Co., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80 (4th
Dist. 1993). In Wakefield, the court held that by discharging a sales employee in order to
deprive him of commissions, the employer may have violated the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing under New York state law, even though the commission agreement
expressly stated that the employee was employed on an at will basis and had to be an active
employee on the date the commissions were to be paid in order to qualify for them.
Wakefield, 769 F.2d at 112. That opinion has not fared well, with most subsequent
decisions suggesting that New York state courts have rejected Wakefield's application of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. See Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int'l Typeface Corp.
43 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that Wakefield has been rejected by New York
state courts); Knudson v. Quebecor Printing (U.S.A.) Inc., 792 F.Supp. 234, 238-39
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (same). In Ellis the California Court of Appeals applied another contract
device in order to void an unfair provision in a commission agreement: substantive
unconscionability. Ellis, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 83. The provision stated that employees would
forfeit any commissions accruing after termination. Id. at 81. The court of appeals held that
the provision was substantively unconscionable and unenforceable. Id. at 85. However, a
later opinion from a different division of the same court refused to follow Ellis, noting that
the opinion was "hard to reconcile with other California appellate decisions which have
shown considerable restraint in second-guessing provisions in employment contracts
governing payment of sales commissions upon termination of employment." Am. Software,
Inc. v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
247. The "procuring cause" doctrine provides that "if the parties have not reached an
express agreement concerning the payment of commissions in the event of termination,...
the sales representative is entitled to recover commissions on all sales for which it was the
procuring cause." Randall J. Gillary & Kevin P. Albus, Unsupportable Limitations on
Michigan's Procuring Cause Doctrine in the Case of Roberts Associates, Inc. v. Blazer
International Corp., 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 101, 106 (2004). However, the rule also
provides that "if the parties have reached an express agreement concerning the commissions
to be paid in the event of termination, the express agreement generally will control, and
commissions should be paid as required by the agreement." Id. The problem for sales
employees is the notion that express agreements trump the procuring cause rule. In Gadsby,
the court held that because there was an express term governing how post-termination
commissions were to be paid, the procuring cause doctrine was inapplicable. Gadsby v.
Norwalk Furniture Corp., 71 F.3d 1324, 1328 (7th Cir. 1996). As noted previously, the
agreement at issue in Gadsby was hardly a model of clarity and thus for the procuring cause
doctrine to be useful, it would have to be recast as a presumption and not a default principle,
a highly unlikely reform given the number of judicial opinions describing its role as a
contract gap filler.
248. "Quasi contract" is "[a]n obligation which the law creates in absence of agreement;
it is invoked by courts where there is unjust enrichment." CSX Transp. Inc. v. Marquar, 980
F.2d 359, 372 n.20 (6th Cir 1992) (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY at 1120 (5th ed.
1979)). In Kidz Cloz, Inc. v. Officially for Kids, Inc., 320 F.Supp.2d 164, 177 (S.D.N.Y.
2004), the court noted that an unjust enrichment or quantum meruit claim requires proof that
"the circumstances were such that equity and good conscience require defendants to make
restitution." Because the plaintiff in that case was employed on an at will basis, the court
held that it had no expectation of future commissions and thus no basis to argue that equity
and good conscience required restitution. Id. In Gadsby, the plaintiff made a similar claim
leading to similar results:
Gadsby's claim for restitution was also properly dismissed in light of the
express contract between the parties. Gadsby has not provided any persuasive
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Ultimately contract law reform is not a promising strategy for change,
for at least two reasons. First too many courts are on record as stating that
contract default rules-particularly the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing-do not trump the at will rule, even in wage accrual disputes where
one might expect to see a greater willingness to depart from free contract
orthodoxy °50 To imagine that all of those courts will now acknowledge
arguments for departing from the general rule that restitution in unavailable
where an express contract governs the parties' relationship and where there is an
adequate remedy at law.
Gadsby, 71 F.3d at 1333. In order for quasi contract to be a meaningful cause of action for
sales employees, it would be necessary, much as it would be for the procuring cause
doctrine, to recast the concept as a presumption (i.e., employers are deemed to be unjustly
enriched when they fail to pay employees commission to which they have a right to expect),
again an exceedingly unlikely reassessment of a long-established principle of law.
249. One scholar has suggested that contingent salary and benefit arrangements be
treated as option contracts. Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reassessing Unilateral Contracts: The
Role of Offer, Acceptance and Promise, 26 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1 (1992). Professor Tiersma
notes that section 45 of the Restatement of Contracts provides that "when an offeror does
not invite a promissory acceptance (intending a unilateral contract), an option contract is
created when the offeree tenders or begins performance .... As a result, the offeror cannot
revoke." Id. at 12. Thus:
[p]articularly if the purpose of the bonus is to induce an employee to remain in
service for a specified time, it may be reasonable to infer that the employer is
implicitly promising to retain the employee (barring good cause for dismissal)
for that period of time. Where there is such a promise, express or implied, the
employer who discharges an employee or terminates the bonus plan is
repudiating or breaching the promise by preventing the employee from meeting
the conditions for payment. If it is likely that the employee would have been
willing and able to complete the required performance absent the breach,
uncertainty is not a critical factor. Furthermore, the employee will quite
rationally rely on having employment for the stated period and might well pass
over other opportunities. Full expectation damages thus seem quite appropriate.
Id. at 67. The theory is interesting but no more promising than any other, at least in the
absence of a substantive re-assessment of what sales agreements are. As Professor Tiersma
concedes:
in an illustration to section 45 ... the Restatement reaches the counterintuitive
conclusion that because the offeror retains the power to revoke (i.e., to
terminate the bonus plan), there is no offer or promise at all. In other words, not
only is there no promise to keep the bonus offer open, but there is also no
promise to pay a bonus under specified circumstances-there is merely an offer
that can be accepted only by completed performance.
Id. at 66-67. Which brings the matter back to where it starts: what was the agreement
between the parties?
250. See, e.g., Production Prod. Co., v. Vision Corp., 706 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2000) (no covenant of good faith and fair dealing in sales commission agreement
otherwise terminable at will); James H. Washington Ins. Agency, v. Nationwide Mutual Ins.
Co., 643 N.E.2d 143, 148 (same); see also Melnick v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.,
749 P.2d 1105, 1109-10 (N.M. 1988) (same, and noting that numerous other jurisdictions
follow same rule).
SALES COMMISSION AGREEMENTS
that they were mistaken is fanciful."5 ' Second, and perhaps most
importantly, contract-based duties simply lack the breadth to compete with
the at will rule on anything approaching a level playing field. What is
needed is a source of rights capable of transcending the four comers of the
agreement that creates the relationship, an improbable, if not illogical,
mandate for the law of contracts.252
A rather stark illustration of the point is provided by the Supreme
Court of Washington's opinion in Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp.253 In
Willis, a commission sales agent entered into a commission agreement with
a wire manufacturer that allowed either party to terminate the agreement on
30 days notice.254 The agreement specifically provided that in the event of
termination, the employer's obligation to pay commissions was limited to
orders accepted by it up to and including the termination date. During his
employment, the sales agent endeavored to convince an extremely large
corporation, Boeing Company, to use his employer's product as "the
general purpose wire for its airplanes. 255 He was terminated, effective
September 24, 1976, and Boeing began using the employer's products,
because the employee's efforts, in July of 1978. The court accepted as fact
that at the time of the employee's termination, the employer "had reason to
believe" 256 that Boeing would convert to it as its supplier of general
purpose wire.
The court refused to recognize that the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing or the procuring cause rule provided any basis to restrain the
employer's actions, even if the employee could have established that the
employer was motivated by bad faith. It based its holding on two
conclusions. The first was that neither the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing nor the procuring cause rule could "override an express
contract provision stating the manner in which commissions would be
paid., 257 The second was the policy determination that employment at will
contracts do not contain implied limitations on employer discretion:
An employer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must
be balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining
his employment and [the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing] does not strike the proper balance. We believe that 'to
251. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Is a Signed Offer Sufficient to Satisfy the Statute of
Frauds?, 80 N.D. L. REv. 1, 8 (2004) (arguing that the large body of case law on this
question militates against new interpretation).
252. See Smith, supra note 35, at 1488 (describing fiduciary duty as broader than the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
253. Willis v. Champlain Cable Corp., 748 P.2d 621 (Wash. 1988).
254. Id. at 622-23.
255. Id. at 623.
256. Id. at 623.
257. Id. at 627.
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imply into each employment contract a duty to terminate in good
faith would ... subject each discharge to judicial incursions in
the amorphous concept of bad faith.' Moreover, while an em-
ployer may agree to restrict or limit his right to discharge an
employee, to imply such a restriction on that right from the
existence of a contractual right, which, by its terms has no
restrictions, is internally inconsistent.
25 8
Obviously if contract duties can be no broader than those described
within the four comers of an unambiguous agreement, such duties are not
broad enough to prevent inceptional opportunism. Moreover, even beyond
the problem of inceptional opportunism, there is the sense, manifest in
Willis, that contract duties do not have the doctrinal fortitude to compete
with the at will rule where the two will continue to collide, at the margins
between an employee's interest in a contingent wage and an employer's
interest in running its business as it sees fit. The at-will principle is focused
and clear: the employer may prospectively affect the terms and conditions
of an employee's employment at any time for any reason. The covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, by comparison, is unfocused and murky: it has
something to do with good faith, but is difficult to define in the abstract.
The necessary context is invariably the terms of the contract giving rise to
the duty, which, as the Willis court points out, gives rise to a circularity: if
the contract is silent on a particular question, how do we coherently answer
the question by reference to the contract?
Fiduciary duty is as clear and as focused as the at will rule. It stands
for the proposition that fiduciaries may not act self-interestedly at the
expense of their principals. It is a duty created by contract but not bounded
by it; it sets the correct tone, carries the correct message, and is therefore
the appropriate standard for restraining employer opportunism under sales
commission agreements.
VII. CONCLUSION
The at-will rule may or may not serve a useful purpose. This Article
did not weigh in on that controversy. Assuming that there is a reason to
keep the rule, there is no justification for applying it to sales commission
disputes that feature allegations of employer opportunism. Regarding
compensation, commission employees are not like other employees. When
fixed-compensation employees are terminated, it is possible to effect the
clean break envisioned by the at will rule. Wage payment laws and other
agency principles ensure that employers settle up with employees before or
shortly after termination, and thus nothing is left on the table when the
258. Id. at 624 (quoting Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1086 (Wash.
1984) (citation omitted)).
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parties part company. Such is not the case for commission employees. For
them, wages do not accrue over time. As a consequence, much is left on
the table, and if employers are as free to affect accrual as they are to affect
job security, it is possible to fire employees and steal the value of their
labor. This Article has illustrated how courts from around the country have
sanctioned just such behavior.
The reform suggested by this paper is to separate analytically the wage
question from the question of job security. Questions of job security
remain the province of employment law and the at-will rule. Questions
concerning commissions are subject to the rule that employers are
fiduciaries and may not act opportunistically unless two conditions are met:
first, that the action is clearly permitted by the commission agreement; and
second, that the provision permitting the action is not deemed manifestly
unreasonable.
The fiduciary standard advocated here was derived from partnership
law. Partnership law is the appropriate starting place for analyzing
commission disputes because sales employment and partnership status are
related economic categories: they both feature delayed remuneration,
compensation as a percentage of profit and reliance on the loyalty and good
faith of co-adventurers. As such, they exhibit similar vulnerabilities to
opportunism. This paper has endeavored to make the case that they also
benefit from similar ameliorative counter-measures.
Some will argue that the proposed reform would result in additional
litigation and fewer commission jobs. It is very hard to address such fears
without devolving into the pat response: i.e., they do not justify the
continuation of an illogical set of rules. Beyond that, it seems clear that
those who continued to employ commission-based compensation systems
would take pains to draft clear agreements and avoid resolving
commissioning disputes in a manner that might later be viewed as
opportunistic. The system that remained, in other words, might be smaller,
but it would be fairer.
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